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Summary findings
As private  firms become  increasingly involved in the  hias  been relatively success,ful  combines new entry,
development  of key infrastructure,  redefiniing the  role of  unbLindled serviccs, and  the unamibhiguous  spelling out of
government  from that  of service provider  to regulator  the legal rights and duties  for both public and  private
presents both  challenges and  opportuniries.  The factors  service providers,  administered  by an autonomous
that give rise to sector reforms color how much  regulatory  autihority. Problems with regulation often
policymakers invest in regulatory  design during  the  result as 111uch  from inadequate  attenrion  to sector
reform process.  structure  and fostering competition  as from weaknesses
Nevertheless,  two  factors are essential to sustainable  in the regulatory  authority's  institutional  capaciry.
sector and regulatory  reform.  First, the right structure  As for the tools of regulation,  despite differences  in
must be established  for the industry concerned,  a  sonic details between  licenses and concessions (and their
structure  that allows competition  appropriate  for that  many contractual  variations),  these are basically
industry.  Second, the objectives of regulation must he  instruments that establish the rights and obligations  of
well defined,  with a clear distinction  between  the contracting  parties.  Choices about where  these rights
policymaking, policy implementation,  and operations.  and  obligations are located  in the  legal hierarchy are
The extent  to which  competition  can be harnessed  to  shaped by a country's  instituLional capacity and legal
help make regulation efficient, effective, and  sustainable  traditions.  But the existence  of instruments  to establish
depends on the intrinsic  technical characteristics  of the  those  rights and obligations  does not eliminate  the need
sector.  Each decision affects the sustainability  of the  for institutions  to administer  them, and thus _arry out
regulatory  regime in the face of the threat  of regulatory  the regulatory  function.
capture  (both political and commercial).  Establishing effective sectorwide  regulation  can be
Careful regulatory  design is crucial not only for  difficult in a developing  country,  but it is necessary.
successful sectoral  reform  but also to balance the  Policymakers will be able to create effective regulatory
interests  of various  actors (government,  consumers,  regimes where  adequate  attention  is given to sector
developers, investors, and  financiers). One model that  structure,  competition,  and  institution-building.
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In this paper, the term "infrastructure"  is used to refer to the key sectors of an economy
such as telecommunications, electricity generation, transmission and distribution, water and
sewerage, roads, ports and airports. In addition, the term "Regulator"  is used to refer to those
entrusted with the supervisory role of government in terms of policy implementation, and does
not assume a bias towards any particular structure (individual  or number of persons) or location
(within or outside of a particular government Ministry).
1.  Introduction
In the process of state sector reform, infrastructure has presented particular challenges
and opportunities. While the demands imposed by users seeking higher levels of service and
price responsiveness have increased, so too has the capacity of the private sector to provide
capital,  technology and management expertise for infrastructure development and operation.
However, the provision of infrastructure has been typically reserved to the public sector, often
by laws, govermment  directives, or even constitutional  provisions. In recent years, experience
has shown that two key ingredients, industry structure and regulation, have emerged as tools to
catalyze the private provision of infrastructure. These ingredients are key because they serve to
impact directly upon the  sustainability of  the  regulatory regime and  its capacity to  resist
pressures to take account of extraneous commercial or political factors.
On the other hand, during the reform process, the amount of investment  or commitment
by  policy-makers in  designing a  regulatory framework which gives attention to these key
ingredients depends on a number of factors. These factors include the availability of technical
assistance and know-how and their funding. Furthermore, the pressures which gave rise to the
reform in the first place also impact upon the commitment  to regulatory design -- for example
a reform program which is aimed at maximizing  privatization receipts is likely to result in less
attention being given to designing a regulatory regime which actively promotes competition
between multiple operators.
In  addition  to  these  constraints  on  regulatory engineering,  the  intrinsic technical
characteristics of the sector, (such as electric power generation or water supply) significantlyinfluences the extent to which these ingredients can be harnessed to lighten the regulatory burden
without impairing its effectiveness or sustainability.
II.  Industry  Structure
Factors  for  Change
In infrastructure, as in any other area of economic activity, there is a dynamic to the
economic and political forces that require response and adaptation over time.,  IL  was not long
before the twin shock waves in the early 1980s of deregulation, which emanated from the United
States,  and  privatization,  which  emanated  from  the  United  Kingdom,  impacted  upon
infrastructure sectors such as airports, telecommunications,  gas, water and electricity as a natural
progression to both the policy changes brought about at the political level and an extension of
the deregulation mid  privatization program in other sectors of the economy, such as trade and
finance. 2 The influences of these shock waves are evident in many developing and newly
industrialized countries where the factors which gave rise to them in industrialized  countries are
shown as applicable in the context of development.
An example may be drawn from the telecommunications  sector. The dramatic pace of
technological development over  the last  decade in  this  important sector  has given  rise  to
significant policy reviews both in industrialized and developing countries. Customer demand,
not only for the basic services of voice telephony, but also for quality value added services is
exerting considerable pressure on traditional approaches  to operation and management. In many
industrialized countries this policy review has led to full privatization, such as in the United
Kingdom  and  Japan,  although  the  regulatory  frameworks  differ.  Privatization  of  the
telecommunications  sector has also found its way onto the agenda in many developing  countries,
such as Mexico,  Argentina, Chile, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In  addition, sectoral
restructuring, corporatization  and deregulation  without privatization  are being actively explored.
Greater  efficiency
1 Due to the capital intensive  nature  of infrastructure,  be it telecommunications,  water  and sewerage,  power
generation  and distribution  o: gas, the ability  of these  sectors  to adapt  to the dynamnics  of changing  requirements
and pressures  inevitably  leads  to a slower  process  of change  than in other  sectors  such as trade  and finance.
2 For example,  in the United  Kingdom,  the Thatcher  government  first tackled  firms like British  Aerospace,
Enterprise  Oil and Jaguar  - none of which raised  any particular  regulatory  or structural  questions.  In finance,
dereguladon  involved  the lifting  of foreign  exchange  controls.  However,  by 1984,  the government  had turned  to
address  the privatization  of Bridsh  Telecom,  the first in a series  of public  utilities  with enormous  market  power.3  Industry Structure andi  Regulation
Aside  from political  considerations,  but  closely  related  to and  directly  under  the influence
of them, is the desire  to brin,g  about  greater  efficiency  in key sectors  of the economy  in question.
Historically, both bilateral and multilateral  development  agencies  have promoted  enterprisq
reform  as the predominant  spur to improve  efficiency,  but with  control  and  ownership  remaining
firmly in goverrnment  hands. Over the last few years however,  private  sector  participation  has
been shown to be a viable instrument  in the toolbox  of policy-makers  in sectors previously
thought  to have  been  the sole  domain  of the state. The  traditional  argument  against  private  sector
provision  of public  services  and infrastructure  centered  on a wish  on the part of government  to
be able to control  the activities  of industries  so fundamental  to the econotny  of the nation -- a
rationale  which  lay behind,  for example,  the nationalization  of electricity  both in developed  and
developing  countries. However, over the last decade, solutions  have emerged in terms of
combinations  of industry structure and regulatory  regime which permit private participation
whilst allowing  government  control of the fundamentals  of the sector. This is not to say that
these solutions  provide immediate  answers to the complex difficulties  of barriers such as
subsidizationr  or tariff imbalances 4 and outright  opposition  by enterprise  management.  These
issues  of course  need to be addressed,  but they are more questions  as to the political  capital  of
the government  sponsoring  the reforms rather than questions  to he resolved  by industry  and
regulatory  structures.
Improving  the ftscal balance
In many  developing  and newly  industrialized  countries  there is a growing  realization  that
the historical  organization  of entire infrastructure  sectors  as integrated  state  monopolies  is often
not the most efficient  way to provide key services, such as telecommunications  and electric
power. Recent  experience  has shown  that monopolies  are not inevitable,  and have often been
sustained  by barriers  to entry. There  is considerable  evidence  to show  that such  sector  structures
provide ample opportunity  for abuse of monopoly  power, especially  where the institutional
capacity  for effective  regulation  is weak. Even in developed  countries  it has been shown  that
3 For example,  in Great Britain  the nuclear  levy, which is a subsidy  on the costs of nuclear power, will
continue  for a number  of years  after  privatization.  The  regulatory  regime  takes  account  of this by placing  a license
obligation  on each  of the 12  regional  power  distributors  to purchase  certain  quantities  of non-fossil  fuelled  power  -
- known  as the NFFO,  or "non-fossil  fuel  obligation".
4 For  example.  significart  cross-subsidization  is evident  in the  power  sector  in Peru  and in  telecommunications
in India.  Generally,  the  telecommunications  sector  as a whole  is a profitable  one, even  when  the quality  of service
is poor, although  it is quite  common  to find  the tariff  structure  such  that  the provision  of local  services  is heavily
subsidized  by trunk  and  intremational  services  and  that  without  tariff  rebalancing,  particular  local  services  would  be
uneconomic.Industry Structure and Regulation  4
integrated  state monopolies  lead to major operational  inefficiencies  and overmanning.5  The
traditional  view that the beiaefit  of economies  of scale  derived  from state  monopolies  outweighs
the drawbacks  of monopolistic  behavior  has been largely discarded,  with a renewed  focus on
creating accountability  in the provision of services through accounting  to shareholders  for
matters such as loss of market share or poor retums on investment,  coupled  with the tool of
irms-length  regulation  to ensure quality  of service  to end-users.
Inefficiency  has of course  not been  the
only impetus to revise sector structure and  Traditionally,  telecommunications  networks  and  related
privatize.6 The need to stem the significant  services  were  considered  a natural  monopoly:  a public
udlity  performing  a public  service  function.  In  addition  to
drain on  goverment  budgetary resources  the  monopoly  of the fixed network,  legal  and technical
was, and still is, a major factor for change,  barriers  to competidon  by new entrants  were the norm.
especially where the country was in acute  thus adding  to the monopoly  power  of the national
budget  deficit. 7 This goal is manifest  at two  provider.  However,  the development  of lower cost exchange  systems  and  network  components  has  reduced
levels. The first (which is complementary  tO  the  technological  barriers  to new  entrants.  This is also
the  goal  of  increasing efficiency) is  the  true  in  the  case  of  mobile cellular technology.
reduction  of  the  burden  in  terms  of  Nevertheless,  whilst in most cases the technological
responsibility to  make  good  operating  barriers  have  been lowered  by innovation,  the legal  and
regulatory barriers have  not  developed with  the
expenses  overruns, meet capital  expenditure  technology  and are often such that the state owned
requirements  and subsidize prices to users.  provider  is constrained  in  its  ability  to meet  user demand.
The second level, which is  the desire to  Historic under-investment  in the telecommunications
sector in developing  countries  has led to poor  quality
maximize privatization  receipts, is actually  service,  equipment  shortage  and,  in  some  cases,  the  rapid
more likely  to be at odds  with other  goals,  development  of  "quick  fix"  solutions  which  are  costly  and
such as the introduction  of competition  into  are arguably  oF  short term  benefit  only.
the sector in question. It follows that there  I Telecomnuunicagions
often  exists  a  tension  between  policy
5 For example,  after the privatization  of the  telecommunications  sector  in New  Zealand  there was  an overall
price  reduction  of 44%  in real  terms  for  a basket  of services  by 1992.  In addition,  the  number  of access  lines  per
employee  increased  from  85 in March 1989  to 163  in December  1992  and staff  numbers  fell from  24,500 in 1987
to 13,600  in 1992.  Likewise,  in the United  Kingdom,  overstaffing  in the  electric  power  industry  was reduced  both
in the run-up  to and after the privatization  of the sector  and the true cost of nuclear  power  was  brought  into the
open.
6 In the British  privatization  program, apart from improving  efficiency  the govemment's  goals included
reducing  the public sector borrowing  requirement,  widening  sharc ownership  to the public  at large, reducing
government  involvement  in enterprise  decision-making  and the determination  of public  sector  pay, and increasing
employee  share ownership.
7 As international  capital markets question  further  lending  ard  multilateral  agencies  review  policy, it is
interesting  to note the effect these influences  are having in promoting  power sector restructuring  through
privatization,  especially  in Latin America.5  Industry  Structure  and Regulation
objectives,  which  may translate into a  conflicting agenda for  sector  restructuring and  the
subsequent role of regulation.8
The early rush to privatize, due to the
The privatization  of British  Gas,  which  was underaken  belief  in privatization  as a possible  cure to the
without  unbundling  of the  sector,  gave  rise  to important  numerous problems so evident in key sectors
lessons  which  were  applied  by the  British  government  to
the  privatization  of electricity.  The ssential  lesson  was  such  a s  power  generation  and
the importance  of sector  restructuring  (in the sense  of  telecommunications,  meant that, in practice,
segmentation)  before  privatization.  the  development of  a  "new  regulatory
framework"  was often left  tc be dealt  with as
Chile  also  made  such  mistakes  in  a privatization  program
for electricity  which  allowed  cross-ownership  and failed  an afterthought.  This was partly due to a
to  unbundle generation and  transmission. Industry  vagueness  about exactly  what the regulatory
structure  and ownership  concentration  in the energy  framework  was  supposed  toachieve.  Overthe
sector  are therefore  still  problem  issues  in terms  of their  las  ew  yas  how  ever a  cere
impact  on regulatory  effectiveness.  last  few  years  however,  a  clearer
understanding has emerged that a piecemeal
In  Peru, however,  early indications  are that  in  the context  approach  to industry structure and regulatory
of  the forthcoming  power  sector privatization,  the  methodology  is  likely  to  deliver  an
importance  of  restructuring  before  privatizadon  (by  means
of  a  horizontal  separation between  generation,  unpalatable  cocktail with unpleasant side-
transmission  and distribution)  in terms  of its impact  on  effects  in  the  medium to  long term.  This
future  regulation  is recognized,  based  on lessons  learned  understanding  is based on experiences drawn
in other  countries.  from  both  developed  and  developing
2 Restructuring  and  privarization:  country  expenence  cour.zries.
The starting point is therefore a long hard look at the industry structure of the sector
concerned, not only in terns of understanding its present standing and how each of the services
are packaged together (which goes to the understanding of the technical aspects of the sector) 9
but also in order to understand fully the implications for regulation of a particular model. This
analysis of industry structure also means that the policy-makers  will need to have a clear vision
of what the sector should look like after privatization, in terms of structure in the medium to
long tenn.  Too often so-called regulatory failure is caused not by a failure of the regulatory
processes themselves,  but a  lack of attention to  detail in the appraisal of  structure and in
8 Though  the  view  of the World  Bank  is that  economic  efficiency  must  prevail.  Objectives  such  as raising
privatization  receipts  should  only  be accommodated  to the extent  that  they  do not conflict  with  the main  objective
of  improving  efficiency:  S.  Kikeri,  J. Nellis  and  M.  Shirley  Privatization:  The Lessons  ofEperience, World  Bank,
1992.
9 In both  natural  gas  transportation  and  electricity  transmission  for  example,  in  order  to allow  open  access  to
operate  truly  on non-discriminatory  terms  and  to be able  to police  pricing  most  effectively,  it is necessary  to
unbundle  the  services  of transportation  or transmission  from  the  energy  elemnent  in the overall  end-user  price.Industry  Structure  and Regulation  6
addressing  these issucs  in both law and regulation  -- in other words, regulatory  failure  is more
likely to stem from a failhre to tailor the regulatory  regime to the industry structure to be
adopted.'°
Th7e  inter-relationship  between  Sector Structure  and Regulation
The realization  that structure  is the starting point ailows  the policy-maker  to develop  a
clear formulation of  the government's policy objectives for  the  sector concerned post
restructuring,  and to make  the vital decision  as to the structure  of the industry  to achievc  those
objectives. There is however  a close  relationship  between  structure  and regulation.  Adopting
a particular structure for the sector, even if it is to remain unchanged,  will have very real
implications  for the type  of regulation  and its effectiveness.  In terms  of the impact  on regulatory
effectiveness,  the extent of the unbundling  in the power  sector  in Great Britain  has for example
allowed  the regulator, an individual  supported  by technical  staff, three key advantages:
*  easier  information  flow  from the privatized  companies;  if one is proving  difficult,
another  can  be a useful  verifying  cross-reference  -- this is particularly  true of the
twelve  regional  electricity  distribution  companies;
a  a yardstick cn performance,  not just in prices, but also in terns  of customer
service  standards  and all other regulated  activities;  and
*  competition  in generation  and supply since the electricity industry has been
divided  horizontally." Competition  is a strong  ally to the regulator.
An example  of this inter-relationship  between  the type or style  of regulation  and sector
structure  may be drawn from natural  gas transportation  to illustrate  the trade-offs  between  the
10  The term "regulatory  failure' is widely  used, but is in fact very subjective  as it depends from which
standpoint  one is considering  the failure.  Regulatory  capture,  however,  is perhaps  a more  helpful  term  and is a risk
for all regulatory  models.  Regulatory  capture  results  when  the regulatory  authority  falls  under the  undue  influence
of either  govenrnent,  which  is generally  termed  political  regulatory  capture,  or the utility,  which is referred  to  as
commercial  regulatory capture. In either case, the effect is to reduce  significantly  the ability  of the regulators  to
act in an independent  manner  in accordance  with the regulatory  brief  given  on appointment.
11  The entire power  sector was  horizontally  divided  between  generation,  transmission  and distribution  with
competition  being  introduced  in generation  and supply,  both at the wholesale  and retail  level. In addition,  a spot
market  for power  trading  was established,  called  the Pooling  and Settlement  System.  Some  large industrial  users
have become  pool members  themselves,  whilst  most others have  entered  into direct purchase  contracts  with  the
generators.*  7  Industry  Structure  and Regulation
amount  of sector  unbundling  undertaken  and
the resultant  impact  on the type of regulation  In  the  power  sector,  complete  vertical  integration  of
which needs to  be instituted.1 2 If  a gas  generation, transmission  and distribution as an
transportation  pipeline  operator  is prohibited  industry  structure  will mean that intrusive  ex ante
by  law from trading in  gas  on  its'own  regulation  will  be nccessary  in order  to mininiize
monopolistic  behavior  against  new entrants.
account," 3 the economic  incentives  are very  Conversely,  where the structure  of 'he industry  is
different from those of a pipeline operator  more  fragmented,  regulation  may be lighter The
who may also trade in gas. The pipeline  existence of multiple providers and  unbundled
operator  will  welcome  requests  for  services  affords  the  regulator  greater  opportunity  to
transportation services, since this will be its  obtain accurate  and useful  information,  which  is
only  source  of  revenue.  If,  however,  the  vital  t  effective  regulation.
operator  trades  in gas itself,  by allowing  third
party access it is diminishing  its own ability
to earn profits on the trading of gas that could  3 Structure  and  regulation:  the  poiver  sectr
have been carried utilizing that relinquished
pipeline  capacity  - it will therefore  not be in the commercial  interests  of the operator  to allow
third party access, or at least allow access  without  attempting  to discriminate  as between  itself
as gas trader  and third party users."  The decision  to be taken  by the policy  maker is therefore
whether  or not to require the unbundling  of trading  and transportation.  This decision  needs  to
be taken in full appreciation  of the likely  consequences  for effective  regulation.  Broadly,  if the
transporter  is pennitted to trade gas on its own account,  the regulatory  regime  will need  to be
more invasive  and proactive  in order to ensure compliance  with any open access obligations
imposed. Also, the regulatory  authority  will need greater ;'stitutional capacity  to be able to
deliver under the terms of its brief.
Taking  this illustration  a stage further -- i.e. beyond  looking  at what economic  activity
is undertaken  by the players  in the industry  concerned  -- the same  economic  effect as a pipeline
operator  trading  in gas  may be brought  about  by cross-ownership  structures  at shareholder  level
or through  nominee  shareholdings  that have  the same effect in terms of economic  incentive  as
allowing  direct trading. This then raises complex  questions  as to what limitations  are to be
12  That is, regulation  a  ante or ex post, proactive  or reactive.
13 With  the limited  exception  of certain  dedicated  pipelines,  this is the case in Argentina.
14  GazproM,  the Russian  gas producer  and transporter  presently  allows  some  third party  access  to pipelines
when  convenient,  but legal priority  is given  to Gazprom's  own gas as over third  parties. In addition,  third party
users  are generally  required  to pay for transportation  services  in hard  currency,  even  though  production  and sales
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placed on cross-ownership  and how they are to be policed, by the regulator or by merger
controls in the country's agti-trust  laws.
Fundamental  decisions,  such  as where  in the sector  competition  is to be introduced  or the
nature of the mechanisms  to be used to regulate  and protect,  will therefore  flow directly from
decisions  taken  in relation  to industry  structure.' 5
Competiton --  Can it be effectively  introduced  and where?
The importance  of competition  as an effective  means of bringing  about efficiency  in
sectors  such as trade  and finance  is widely  known.  In sectors  such as water and sewage,  roads,
electric  power  and telecommunications,  the  feasibility  of introducing  competition  requires  careful
consideration.  Where  the policy  maker  is minded  to introduce  competition,  two basic  questions
arise: how far should  competition  be introduced  into the sector, and how is that competition  to
be introduced?
The answers to these fundamental  questions  will shape the future of the sector. For
example, in relation  to telecommunications,  should the introduction  of competition  be limited
to  value added services only or  include basic telephony?' 6 In  electric power, should
competition  be limited  to genecration,  or should  it be extended  to distribution  activities?' 7 If
so, to what level?  In finding  answers to these sorts of questions,  the policy  maker will need  to
have  due regard for the particular  nature  or technical  characteristics  of the sector in question.
This is simply  because  the introduction  of competition  is likely  to be inherently  easier in some
15 In the restructuring  of the electric power  sector in Great Britain  prior to privatization,  the decision  to
separate  generation,  transmission  and distribution  allowed  the effective  introduction  of competition  in generation
and  supply,  leaving  transmission  and  distribution  as regulated  natural  monopolies.  In  Chile,  where  the  almost  unique
opportunity  exists  to develop  the  natural  gas  industry  from  scratch,  it is recognized  that  considerations  as to future
industry  structure  will  directly  affect the role, methodology  and success  of future  regulation.
16 Given the rapid development  of new technology  in telecommunications,  attempts  to define  distinctions
between  value added  and other services  rapidly  become  constraints  to entry in themselves,  contrary  to original
intentions.  Nevertheiess,  in the privatization  of British  Telecom,  for an initial period  of the duopoly  of British
Telecom  and Mercury,  cable companies  were only  permitted  to offer voice  telephony  in conjunction  with one of
the duopolists.
17 A distinction  can be drawn  between  distribution  as the  physical  network,  plant  and apparatus,  which  is still
regarded  as a natural  monopoly,  and the activity  of distribution  over  these  assets,  which  may  be carried  on by any
person. Competition  at the retail level  was introduced  in Great  Britain  by means  of this distinction  - the former
being  the 'wires business' and the latter  being  referred  to as the 'supply  business'.9  bIdustry  Structure  and Regulation
sectors than in others."'  Even within a particular sector, competition  may be easier to
introduce in certain parts 9f the sector as against  others. The classic  example  of this is the
relative  ease with  which  competition  in generation  may  be allowed  in the power  sector  as against
the provision  of other services,  such  as transmission  and distribution.  Due  to the importance  of
the particular  nature of infrastructure  sectors  and the differences  between  them, set out below
is a short summary of the salient features  of telecommunications,  power, natural gas and
transport.
A.  Telecommunications
Given the relative economies  of scale of fixed networks  and the need for efficient
allocation of capital resources, governmental  reviews of the telecommunications  sector in
developing  countries  often  result in an approach  which  involves  a mixed  system  of a monopoly
national  provider (made more operationally  efficient,  where possible)  with the promotion  of
competition  in certain  services.  One  particular  example  would  be the introduction  of competition
in areas  such as equipment  supply,  both in terms  of equipment  sourcing  and  authority  to supply.
Whilst  there is this blend,  the policy will generally  tend to give more emphasis  to one
of the following  objectives: either (a) the extension  of the network and thus the level of
telephone  penetration,  using modern  technology  where  possible,  '9 leaving  value  added  services
to follow  in due course;  the policy  goal is, in short, to enhance  the networks,  be they  at a local
or national  level, as quickly  as possible;  or (b) the improvement  in the quality  of service  and
facilitation  or promotion  of competition  by permitting  or encouraging  new  entrants  into one or
more of the three main sectors of the telecommunications  market, namely  (i) the supply  of
apparatus  for connection  to networks;  (ii) the provision  of services  over networks  and (iii) the
running  of the networks  themselves.
Depending  on the nature of its particular  telecommunications  sector, each country  will
emphasize  these objectives  differently.  Where there is low penetration  with disproportionate
concentration  in centers  of population,  the emphasis  will be upon increasing  the level of basic
services by increasing  basic voice telephony  penetration  znd developing  a wider network in
la For  example,  owmpetition  in roads  is  hard  to conceive.  However,  in Argentina,  the  use  of concessions  for
stretches  of lOOkm  has  allowed  the  private  sector  to operate  and mainuin  toll roads.  In Hong  Kong,  the  Tate's Caim
*  Tunnel  was consructed by the private  sector  to connect  Shatin  and the New  Territories  to East Kowloon  and in
Thailmd the Don Muang  Tollway  is planned  to connect  the intematioa1  airport in Bangkok  with the Bawkok
Second  Stage  Expressway  (Source:  Princeton  Pacific  Group).
19 For example,  build  operate  transfer  (BOT)  schemes  for private  systerns  which  interconnect  to the  national
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geographic terms. Where there is significant penetration, but poor call completion rates or high
call charges, the response will be to introduce competition in local and long distance services,
as well as products aimed at the business community such as cellular or leased lines. Where
privatization is pursued, each country is likely to adopt a different stance as to what parts of the
telecommunications  sector should be opened to private investment. The relative emphasis given
to these objectives will flow through to effect the form of legal and regulatory framework which
will be brought into being, and the extent of deregulation.
If the primary policy objective is the rapid physical extension of the network rather than
competition and deregulation considerations, and if the achievement  of that goal is perceived as
requiring the participation of foreign strategic investors (which  is often the case as such investors
provide not only capital, but also the necessary know-how and technology), it is likely that the
host government will assign low priority to the development  of a regulatory framework which
facilitates competition in the short to medium term. This is principally due to the preference on
the part of govermnents to offer monopoly privileges in order to preserve a degree of cross-
subsidization so that monopoly rents can be applied to fund network expansion, especially for
rural services 20 --  an emphasis on exclusive franchises as over direct competitionP which
is questionable given the rapid developments in technology which  -can erode in practice the
monopoly rights granted in the license, concession or law.'  The result is effectively to defer
consideration of a regulatory framework which facilitates or promotes competition as a matter
to be dealt with in the future.
On the one hand, a policy which limits direct head-on competition  and focuses on system
or  network expansion is understandable given the significant demand in  many developing
countries and  the  desire  to  spread investment as  widely as  possible.  A  period of limited
competition may be considered highly desirable in terms of the amount of tine  needed to reduce
subsidies, rebalance tariffs and downsize in staffing so as to be enable the existing operator to
compete with  new entrants  on a level playing field.'  Alternatively, a  policy of  allowing
20 Rural  telecommunications,  in particular  public  call  offices,  can  in fact  be highly  profitable  in their  own  right.
21 In addition, those who are most likely to benefit from the  promotion  of competition  and choice - the
consumers  -- are often  the least mobilized  and organized  as against  the interests  of industry.
22  Callback.  for example,  is in practice  significantly  eroding  the monopoly  rights  of CANTV  in Venezuela  on
international  services.  This allows  a call which  originates  in Venezuela  to trigger  a return  call from the original
recipient  without  the first call being  completed.  As a result, the actual  completed  call originates  from outside
Venezuela.
23 In practice, this adjustment  period  can provide  a winJow of opportunity  to the incumbent  operator  to
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limited new entry may be deemed expedient in order to foster the new entrant so that it may
present real competition in the future; this was the cornerstone of the duopoly policy adopted
in Great Britain for a limited period of time.
On the other hand, a real pitfall arises which is particularly problematic in countries with
little regulatory capacity or experience. Policy-makets should recognize that the nature of the
regulatory burden is markedly different when little to no competition is introduced; the burden
on regulators is heavier. This is because there are minimnal  market pressures brought to bear on
the service provider as a spur to efficiency. In practice, the developing countries with the least
institutional capacity and experience of autonomous  regulation and regulatory institutions often
pursue this approach; an approach which calls for more proactive and invasive regulation and
thus a greater regulatory burden. Ironically, those countries which have the least regulatory
experience would be well served in  introducing greater  competition, since competition and
market forces lighten the regulatory burden.
Where foreign strategic investors are invited to participate, host governments usually
offer geographic or  market segment exclusivity for  the reasons mentioned above.  Foreign
investors  will usually  take whatever  protection they  can  obtain,  such  as  exclusivity  and
stabilization provisions 24 in  the  concession contract,  license or  acquisition agreements5
supported, where possible, by  similar provisions in  sectoral regulations or  legislation. The
resulting entrenchment  of exclusivity  rights (supported  by stabilization  provisions for the foreign
investors) acts as a constraint on the ability of the government in the future to permit competition
and allow new entrants into the market. Consequently,  even where the principal policy objective
of a government is network enhancement, it is advisable to consider the future development of
the sector  and its deregulation (in the sense of the removal of barriers to new entrants and
related issues) and re-regulation  (in the sense of policing the  behavior of enterprises in a
monopoly or dominant market position). In practice, this will mean that terms and conditions
for entry, licensing or concession should be reasonably well developed by the host govermment
and its agencies and advisors prior to exposure to potential major investors for comment. This
allows the longer term consequences of matters such as the grant of exclusivity to be weighed
23(  .continued)
organize resistance  to reform and new entry  rather than engage in a measured  program  of restructuring  in
preparation  for the  new  competitive  market.
24  Stabilization  provisions  can vary widely,  depending  on the nature  of the risk  as perceived  by me investor,
ranging  from  indemnities  in relation  to import  duties  or other  taxes  beyond  an agreed  level  through  to undertakings
in relation  to tariff increases  and put options.
25 There are  of course  examples  of foreign  investors  not  asking for geographic  exclusivity,  but in return
expecting  only limited  supply  obligations  to be placed  upon them.Industry Structure and Regulation  12
by policy-makers in terms of impact on future regulatory effectiveness and wider sector policy
considerations absent the piessure of the investors. This proactive approach to the development
of new entry conditions is preferable to the host government reacting to initiatives  drafted by the
major investor, which confers a negotiating advantage on the investor.
Where the policy is directed primarily at the introduction of competition, there are a
number  of  key  issues  which  must  be
addressed to permit the restructured sector to
function in the manner intended. One of these  Other critical legpl  and  policy issues which arise in the
issues is that of interconnection  of networks.  context of interconnection  include the  following:
Given that the restructured and corporatized
national telecommunications enterprise will  *  should  the new  entrant  pay  a  fee  to  the
incumbent  network  operator  to compensate  in
still occupy a dominant or monopoly market  part for the sunk cost of the local network?
position in the absence of new entrants, the
incumbent provider will be placed under an  *  how should charges for the use of the relevant
obligation to provide interconnection, either  network be set and reviewed?
under the terms of its concession or License  . is the new entrant to be entited to reqUir  the
or explicitly  in the enabling  legislation.  The  incumbent  operator  to bill its subscribers for
tenrs  of  that  right  to  connection  will  their use of the new entrant's services?
determine the  scope  and  effectiveness  of *  on  what  basis  should  dfiee  be  an  apportionment
competition.  However,  it  is  not  only  the  of the risks of outages to either network as a
terms which are important, but also in what  result of the operation of the other network?
instrument those terms will be located, since
*  should  the incumbent  operator  be entitled  to
in developing countries major investors may  require that subscribers  of the new entrant use
have  little  confidence  in  the  general  access codes to enter the national  network?
competition law and in the judicial system to
award and enforce the necessary remedies.'6 *  what limitaions  should exist on  the right of
either  the  incumbent operator  or  the  new
Where possible, the right  to interconnect  entrant  to make  commercial  use  of information
should be placed at as high a level as possible  gained ihrough  iterconnection as to the other's
within the hierarchy of instruments that make  customer base and their rquiments?
up  the  body  of  the  law of  the  country  in  0  what stps  should be taken for the protection of
question.  UJsually, this  will mean that  the  priprcary  products and sevices?
sectoral primary legislation will either place
an obligation on the system operator or grant
a  right to  third  parties.  The  next level of  4 njemCnneaion  issues  in telecomnicaiioni
26  These  instruments range  from  prmary  legislation  (such  as a Constitution  or Act  of  Parliament)  through
secondary  legislation  (such  as a Decree  or ministerial  resolution)  to local regulations  in a federal  jurisdiction  and
contracts, which are personal.13  Industry  Structure  and  Regulation
detail as to terms may then be included in secondary legislation (or regulations) made under the
primary legislation or  by ministerial resolution. Finally, greater specification may then be
included in  the concession or  License, deriving authority from the instruments in the legal
hierarchy.'  The willingness of a government to  tackle such issues in  primary legislation,
which necessarily  means that they are  more entrenched, may be seen  as  one indicator of
commitment to reform of the sector. Where the country concerned has a weak judiciary or
inadequate competition law, interconnection issues require more elaboration and specification
in substantive rules which can be easily implemented as against  process regulation which relies
heavily on an independent and impartial judiciary.
The interconnection agreement between the incumbent  operator and the new entrant is
central to the development of conditions for genuine competition. The government will want to
ensure,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  national telecommunications enterprise  negotiates that
agreement in good faith, and on the other hand, that the terms of interconnection will spur
competition and avoid the creation of a duopoly. 2 The role of the government in this process
can range from setting the general parameters for the interconnection  agreement to prescribing
the standard terms in the concession or license to providing standard form agreements with more
general concession or license obligations  prohibiting discrimination  between any person or class
of persons  applying for  an interconnection agreement where the  applicant has  been duly
authorized and  qualified by  the Regulator or  relevant Ministry. The degree  to  which the
government intervenes in the contractual  terms partly depends  upon the reliability of the judicial
system to balance the negotiating advantage of the incumbent operator, but also on the extent
to which standardization impacts regulation in practical application. The  key advantages to
developing standard terms and conditions for interconnection are that (a) it reduces overall
transaction costs, which ultimately benefits consumers, and (b) it lightens the regulatory burden
insofar as it provides the regulator with a ready benchmark against which to test allegations of
abuse  or  discrimination.  For  example, if  the  incumbent operator  were  to  offer  wholly
unreasonable liability clauses, the reasonableness of that provision can be tested against the
standard or model terms for that class of user.
27 In Hungary, for example,  the provisions  relating  to interconnection  were not included  in the primary
legislation, but were dealt with in secondary sources.
2S Although. in the case of the telecommunications  privatization  in the Great Britain, the creation of a duopoly
was part of the govemment's declared policy, albeit subsequently reviewed. The rationale for this initial duopoly
policy was the perception that it would facilitate competition by allowing the rapid development of a single
competitor  of some strength coMpared  to British  Telecom. For the purposes  of interconnection however, the terms
of the licenses are generic in order to prevent the blocking of future competition:  the process of new market entry
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Finally,  Value  Added  Network  Services  (VANs)"0 Leprqsent  an  area  of  the
telecommunications market  which  is  widely perceived  as  lending  itself  more  easily  to
competition due to the lesser economies  of scale than those which exist in basic services. Basic
services cover  the functions of  transmitting and  switching information over  networks and
switching facilities, be they local, national or international. In this area, a competing service
provider without its own transmission facilities can do little more than resell capacity purchased
from the national telecommunications  enterprise.
In practice, the boundary between VANs and basic services has become blurred and the
classifications in some instances are stretched. For example, packet-switching  services constitute
simply a more efficient method of ordinary telephony. As an alternative therefore, rather than
distinguishing between value added services and basic services,  a distinction can  be drawn
between the provision and use of services.'  If competition is to be encouraged in VANs rather
than basic services,  it should be noted that lack of definitional clarity as  to  the activities
authorized can result in effectively deterring major investors due to uncertainty as to the rights
conferred and where the boundaries lie.
B.  Electricity
Many of the issues in the power sector are similar to those in telecommunications,  such
as the introduction of competition in equipment supply. Beyond this, there is broad agreement
that it is relatively simple to introduce competition in generation, unlike the transmission and
distribution systems, 3'  where there is a  natural monopoly. The debate in many countries
centers on  the question of the separation of transmission and distribution services from the
supply of electricity such as to allow competition  in supply, at both the bulk and retail level. In
many countries, the provision of distribution  and transmission represents a rolled up package of
services -- the electricity price therefore includes not only the energy charge, but also the use
of system or "wires" charges. This means that the distributor, in countries where the sector
structure allows exclusivity for the given distribution area, is in a monopoly  position vis-a-vis
end users within that area. This monopoly  is even stronger where the power utility is a vertically
29 Services provided  over the networks  which involve  some additional  service beyond the transmission  af voice
or data; for example electronic information  services, credit card verification,  electronic mail and store and forward
services.
30 In this context, simple resale becomes  a possibility.  If pricing is not cost based however, this approach only
permits entrants to undercut the national telecommunications  provider for so long as prices are not rebalanced.
31 That is, the assets of distribution and not the activity.15  Industry Structure and Regulation
integrated entity, controlling transmission as well as distribution, especially  where the consumer
has no right of access. Accordingly, end users are not able to access other power suppliers. 3Z
It follows from this that the question of the extent of competition boils down to who holds rig:its
of access and use of the transmission and distribution systems, and on what terms. These then
are the same issues as interconnect rights in telecommunications.
Competition may, of course, be limited to wholesaling -- in other words, to the bulk
supply points.  This would mean that only those directly connected to the transmission system
may purchase direct from generators. Typically, these  users would  be distributors (assuming  that
distribution is separate from transmission) and very large industrial users,  such as aluminum
smelters.3 The introduction of  competition at this level usually requires the  introduction,
through the legal and regulatory framework, of rights of access on non-discriminatory  tenns due
to capacity limitations on the transmission network.'  On the other hand, the arguments put
forward by transmission system operators against open access 35 are that competition and open
access threaten long term system security and reliability at a technical level. 36
Beyond competition in generation and bulk supply, competition may also be introduced
at the retail level -- that is, the right on the part of generators and other distributors to supply
end users  connected to the distributor's  system thereby allowing the end user to bypass the
monopoly of the local distributor.37  This is, however, more controversial, especially where the
32  This inability to access is economic (in the sense  that it would not be viable to construct their own systems)
and, often, legal (in the sense that there are legal prohibitions against self-supply).
33  The development of the high voltage transmission system in the United States has been such that even
without direct govemment intervention such competition  has developed  by freely negotiated  contracts for wheeling
power. One reason for this may have been the fact that there has  been more than sufficient  capacity  on transmission
systems.
34 In many developing  countries, where the transmission  system  is tightly designed to single rather than double
circuit security standards, transmission capacity is often limited. This is the case in Peru.
35 The European Commission's draft directives  on third party access are thought to have foundered  on these
arguments.
36 In the experience of the National Grid Company in Great Britain, where open access applies, this does not
appear to have been the case even where there are real technical constraints on the system -- for example, the
Northern Ring and the Anglo-Scottish  Interconnector.  It should  be noted however that in terms of industry  structure,
the restructuring of the power sector prior to privatization resulted in the transmission  grid being separated from
the business of trading in power.
37 In Great Britain  any person whose consumption  is over 1MW (reducing to 100kW  in 1994)  may purchase
power by direct contract with a generator or another distribution  company acting as 'second tier supplier". The key
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distributor  is  under  a  universal  supply
obligation for all users within the distribution  There  are  a number  of important  policy  and  legal
area and also has obligations to build out or  issues which arise in  the context of  wheeling
extend the distribution system. There are two  electric  power  which will include  the following:
real risks in allowing open competition  at this  *  how are use of system  charges  to be
level; loss of market share to such a degree  categorized (such  as  entry,  cxit,
as  to result  in stranded investment and the  infrastructure  and  demand  related  charges)
risk of default under long term commitments  and how  will they be set and reviewed?
under  power  off-take  contracts  from
independent  power producers. Accordingly, it  0  to what  extent  should  any  connection  fee
be borne  as a capital charge  as against  a
is usually  the case that a regime  needs to be  demand  related  charge? A high capital
introduced which allows for the distributor to  connection  fee may be a barrier to new
retain  a  customer  base  which  is  beyond  entrants.
competition. The term  "franchise" has been
used in this context.  *  who  bears risk  on outages  and interruption
and how are risk  allocation  provisions  to
tbe  determined?
In  setting the  level of  the franchise
limit, such as the initial 1MW threshold in  *  what  provisions  are to be included  for de-
Great Britain, due account is to be taken of  energization?
the dynamics of the market and the franchise
limit should therefore be flexible enough to  *  will  the local operator  provide  top-up  and
ensure  that  it  may  be  reduced  as  standby  services  and if so, on what basis?
circumstances  dictate  in  order  to  prevent  5 Use  of Sysrem  Agreements  in electricity
abuse of the franchise market." 8 Alternative
approaches to setting a franchise limit would be either to allow competition at the retail level
only for new demand coming on to the system or to allow end users the right to choose but only
with sufficiently long periods of notice to the distributor before being entitled to "contract out"
of the franchise market. The issue of stranded investment  may therefore be considered as little
more than a transitional problem in the progression from a state monopoly provider to full
competition at the retail level. Rapid technological  development in intelligent metering systems
is such that full retail competition is no longer to be ruled out on technological grounds.
Similar to interconnection  in telecommunications,  the development  and application  of use
of system agreements (being contracts which permit the use of another person's  transmission
3
38 One method  is to place  the  distributor  under  an obligation  to purchase  power  from  the  most  economic  source
available,  and where  purchases  have  been  found  to have  exceeded  the  requirement,  the  difference  may  not be passed
through  to the franchised  end-user.  Conversely,  in Chile, limitation  on electricity  purchase  cost pass  through  is
brought  about by the technique  of setting  tariffs  by reference  to a theoretical  utility as a comparator.17  Industry  Structure  and  Regulation
and/or distribution assets to wheel electric power) is central to the development of cenuine
competition in the electricity sector. They provide suppliers the means of access to end-users
who are embedded in a  competitor's physical system and who would otherwise be captive
customers of that supplier's competitor. 39
If competition is only to be introduced at the wholesale level, these contracts will be
limited to the use of the transmission system in order to allow direct purchasing from generators.
If ,etail competition is to be included, even when limited, a form of use of system contract for
the utilization of distribution assets will be necessary.
Where the national transmission  company is prohibited from trading in electricity on its
own account or  is required to operate its "wires business" separate from trading with legal
provisions requiring ring-fenced accounting, the use of system agreements will be limited to the
provision of transmission services. However, given the need for system integrity and security
of supply, backstop services are required in the form of top-up supplies where the user has taken
more power than contracted for, and stand by where the generator fails to generate and the
demand is met from other sources.
C.  Natural Gas
The production of natural gas is often associated  with the production of oil. As a result,
the exploration for and production of natural gas has long been the domain of the major oil
companies, and therefore the industry at first developed more in line with the oil business than
on its own account. However, as gas reservoirs were discovered where production was not
associated with the production of oil and the market  for natural gas developed, replacing
manufactured  or town gas, the industry emerged in its own right. The activities in natural gas
involve production (or regasification where liquified natural gas is imported), transportation
through  a  high  pressure  pipeline system  to  regional  off-take points,  local low  pressure
distribution to customer premises' and the trading or sale of gas.
An important feature of the natural gas industry is the marked variation in prices at the
well-head. Due to the high risks and capital investment associated with bringing a gas field on
stream, the price is also a function of the level of the take-or-pay commitment and the length
of the contract. These long term contracts with producers reflect the prevailing market conditions
at the time. The level of takle-or-pay  risk is often a key determinant in addressing industry
39  For example, generator G wishes to supply customer C who is embedded  in a distribution  system belonging
to distributor D. The Use of System Agreement allows G to use its competitor's (D's) system to access C.Industry Structure and Regulation  18
structure,  since the  risks  will need to  rest
with  those  most  able  to  bear  anra manage  Prior  to privatization,  Gas  del Estado of Argentina
them.  This  factor  may,  of itself,  preclude  or  was an integrated  monopoly  in both transportation
limit the degree  of possible  competition for a  and  distribution  and acted as  sole gas  trader.
However,  it did not engage  in production.  Instead
considerable  period.  fullsep  tin  othe  the  ga  Gas del Estado purchased  gas from Yacimientos
possibility  for  full  separation of  the  gas  Petroliferos  Fiscales. As a result of  restructuring for
trading  function  from  transportation  and  privatization, the  operations  of Gas  del Estado werc
distribution  in a mature  gas  market  is likely  divided into ten;  two  separate businesses for
to  be  limited  by  the  risks  inherent  in  large  transport,  and eight  distribution  corporations.  These
long  term  gas  purchase  contracts. 40 One  corporations  also  provide services  such as gas
treatment and  storage.  The  new  regulatory approach  to  this  difficulry  has  been  to  tramnadsoag.Ieew  euaoy
mapproac toe functhios  dithinthe  hasmbeleng  frameworkl  establishes  rules  against  cross-ownership
with the aim  of ensuring  that  business  is conducted
entity,  but  require  the separation  in terms of  at arm's length.
internal business divisions.  This  allows some
degree  of  transparency into the  interaction  6 Natural gas in Argentina
between these divisions, but the British Gas
experience has shown that this is likely to hamper regulatory effectiveness.
Nevertheless, if  the benefits of competition are  to be obtained, competition may be
introduced at two levels; bulk  supply and retail.  These are similar  to the  options for the
introduction of competition in the power sector. Large industrial users or gas-fired generation
stations directly connected to the high pressure network may be entitled to purchase quantities
of gas direct from producers for delivery either at the beach or the factory gate.4' Obviously,
to the extent that the national gas enterprise is losing market share,  its risk under  existing
contracts increases. Where the market is expanding however, this risk is less significant.
Competition may also be introduced  at the retail level, and the issues of connection and
open  access,  as  in  telecom-l  unications  and  electricity,  become  paramount  to  effective
competition. As explained above, where the functions of gas trading and transportation are
separated, competition and regulation are greatly assisted due to the resultant transparency.
40 Where gas has been contracted for on field depletion  contracts rather than supply contracts, field risk arises
in addition to take-or-pay risk.
41  The delivery point will determine who will need to enter into a gas transportation agreement with the
transporter, the customer or the producer.19  Industry Structure and Regulation
D.  Transport
Unlike the telecommunications, power and gas sectors, the issues which arise in the
transport sector are quite diverse. First, transport covers a wide range of activities and assets -
ranging from shipping, buses and road haulage through to railways, ports and airports. The
extent to which competition may be introduced  is largely determined by physical limitations, for
example there are a limnited  number of "slots" in a day available for aircraft at any given airport.
The entry barriers to  road haulage are low in comparison to ports and airports. Unlike the
telecommunications and power sectors, the introduction of competition is likely to  be more
difficult in ports, airports and railways. There is of course competition to the extent ports or
airports are geographically close to each other in terns  of substitution, but the nature of the
services are highly diverse compared to the homogenous nature of electricity. Competition in
services such as stevedoring on board ship,  shore handling and warehousing within ports is
feasible although most of the functions related to safety, navigation and the environment are
controlled.  It  follows that the terms of  the licenses or  concessions assume much greater
importance since the incentives to efficiency are provided through these instruments rather than
by the introduction of competition.
Throughout  the  world,  the  airline
The  privatized British Airports Authority (BAA)  is  industry  is  heavily  regulated  in  terms  of
subject  to government  regulation  not  only in terms  of  economic  regulation as well as matters such
safety  and environmental  standards,  but  also  in terms  of  a
each airport license.  This enables  the Civil Aviation  as  safety, noise control and  security. This
Authority  (CAA)  as regulator  to limit  aircraft  movements, regulation has involved allocation of routes,
allocate slots between  airlines and establish  rules on  control of airports and the setting of fares.
traffic  distribution. In  addition, all  airports above a  in the United States in
certain size ace subject to  economic regulation in
accordance  with conditions  attached  to permissions  which  been slow to be replicated in other countries,
enable  the levy of airport  charges.  The CAA must  also  partly  due  to  difficulties  in  amending
have  due  regard  to intemational  obligations,  such  as  those  international conventions  and agreements at
under  the Chicago  Convention.  gt
governmental level.
7 Regulation of airports in Grea! Britain
The  nature  of  competition  and
regulation in aviation varies from route to route.  One of the benefits of deregulation in the
United States has been a reduction in average airfares and wider consumer choice. At the same
time there have been a number of airline failures and significant mergers which have served to
concentrate ownership within the  industry. In addition, considerable local market power is
derived from airlines operating from particular cities as their "hub", which may serve to restrict
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Railways  have certain characteristics  which have direct impact on the strategy to be
adopted  by policy-makers  as against  other  modes  of transport.  First, there is a closer  interaction
bctween  infrastructure  and the vehicle  which,  although  technical  and  operational,  has  commercial
implications.  Performance  may be improved  by focusing  on cither  the infrastructure  of the track
and signalling,  or on the rolling  stock.  Secondly,  since  railways  are networks,  there are complex
interactions  between users which give rise to constraints, such as the way train paths are
determined. 4'  Third, the infrastructure  costs are a high proportion  of the total  operational  costs
of the system, 43 and rolling  stock itself is expensive,  with a long useful life and custom  built.
As a result, there is often no market  for second-hand  rolling  stock. Lastly, railways  often  own
real estate which is under-developed,  and the sale or let of surplus  land often can be used  to
partly finance  new investment.
When  the Argentine  government  reorganized  Ferrocarriles  Argentinos (FA) in 1989  in
preparation for privatization, these factors played an important role in determining the way in
which the private sector was to enter. FA was responsible  for both passenger  and cargo rail
services, operating  a network of six main railway lines and the urban and metro systems  in
Buenos  Aires. This reorganization  resulted  in the letting  of all profitable  services  by concession
to the private  sector and  the  closure of  loss-making lines coupled with the  sale of  FA's
considerable  real estate holdings.  In Buenos  Aires, the metro  system  was  reorganized  into  a new
company under a  separate regional authority to  regulate operations in  both the  metro and
suburban rail systems. Competition has therefore not been introduced directly, but efficiency
incentives have been established for the private operators under the terms of their respective
concessions.  Conversely,  in  the  proposed privatization of  British Rail  in  Great  Britain,
competition is envisaged at two levels; first, the introduction  of open access to the rail network
for operators of freight and passenger services who obtain a license and, secondly, in the case
of passenger services only, competition for the franchise to offer a particular service. It remains
to be seen how this model  will work in practice.
How is competition to be introduced?
Once the extent of competition  has been decided, the policy  maker should then decide
exactly  how that competition  is to be introduced  and what form it should  take.
42 This is usually  a centralized  task, resulting  in a national  timetable.
43 For example,  track  costs  amount  to approximately  48% of British  Rail's total expenditure.  This compares
to airlines  airport and navigation  charges  which  are approximately  10%  of their costs.21  Industry Structure  and Regulation
Many of the arguments over the extent  of competition  are actually  arguments as to timing
and, in this respect, a balance has to be struck by the policy-maker.  If competition is allowed
to develop too slowly, the incumbent  provider has little incentive  to eliminate  monopoly rents.
This  is especially true if  the market is robust and there  is strong demand --  such as  in
telecommunications.  In addition, slow development of competition  increases the likelihood of
collusion between the limited number of players, rather than competition  between them. On the
other  hand,  allowing competition too  rapidly may  result  in  a  lost  opportunity to  gain
organizational efficiencies for  the  incumbent provider,  especially where that  provider  is
organizationally  weak.  Instead  of  the
incumbent provider being able to adapt and
respond to  market  forces,  it  may  fail  In Hungary,  the  initial  privatization  plan  for  natural
altogether. If  this is  likely, restructuring  gas distribution  failed largely  due to political
before allowing full competition may be the  concerns  about  the ability  of the distributors  to
only  viable  option  provided  that a deadline  is  adapt  to market  forces  and  the  extent  and  timing  for
introduced  to that period. Slow  adaptation  in  the introduction  of competition.  However,  certain
the face of minimal competition is likely to  preparatory  steps  were  undertaken  to
e'demonopolize'  the  sector:  the  OKGT,  which  -.as
result in  the  incumbent service provider  the trust which  operated  the entire  oil and gas
diverting energies to slow further the growth  sector,  was divided  into (a) MOL  as owner  of
of competition rather than changing to meet  refineries,  storage  and  transportation  pipelines  and
the  challenge. Equally, to  admit too many  (b) six regional  gas distributors. l .e  LPG
small competitors at once may result in the  businesses  were  hived-off  and  privatized  separately.
incumbent provider continuing to dominate
the  market. It was for this reason that the  - - - m 8  Adaptation  to marker  forces:  Hungary
British government endorsed the  "duopoly
policy" in telecommunications,  which allowed for limited competition  for a period of years.
In the power sector, where the planning  function  plays a central  role due to the universal
supply obligation  placed on distributors, it is important that the introduction  of competition is
handled in such a way as to ensure that capital investments  with long pay-back periods or long
term commitments  to generators are not jeopardized, thereby leading to greater inefficiencies.
This calls for a strategy which allows competition  to be brought into the sector in steps."
There are a number of options as to the precise nature of the mechanism  which may be
used for competition.  The mechanism  used will play a key role if the process of restructuring
is to produce a new industry structure that operates more efficiently. For example, in order to
allow effective competition, the restructuring of the British electricity industry required the
" In  Great  Britain,  the  franchise  limit  is  designed  to  reduce  in  steps  over  a  number  of  years,  from  lMW  down
to 100kW  in 1994  to its abolition  in 1998.Industry Structure  and Regulation  22
creation of a mechanism for the pooling of power into a single market and for expeditious
financial settlement between the  players in  the new competitive market. The Pooling and
Settlement system was therefore the mechanism  established to ensure the smooth day to day
operation of the half-hourly spot market in power. A system somewhat  similar to this has been
established in Argentina in the context of the privatization  of SEGBA. 4s
The inter-relationship  between  Competition  and Regulation
Both academics and politicians have in the past emphasized  that effective competition  in
a market reduces the need for external regulation, principally because strong competition for a
market constitutes a self-regulating system which ensures the elimination of excess profits.
Competition drives firms to reduce their costs as much as possible to minimize loss of market
share to competitors, and spurs innovation,  research and  development.  Furthermnore,  where there
are many players in the market, the opportunities  for collusive  and anti-competitive  behavior  are
severely limited. In comparison, regulation  is often  difficult to establish, cumbersome  and costly
and prone to neutralization  by capture. It is therefore understandable  that many have proposed
that regulation in  infrastructure is  a transitory phase, to be  replaced by  competition once
sufficient entrants are operating in the market. However, while the extension of competition
undoubtedly serves to assist regulation, in infrastructure  sectors in particular, regulation is still
required in order to allow competition to be effective.
It may be argued that if the market is fully contestable, regulation ex post in the form of
anti-trust law would  be sufficient. The test would be such that the failure of any one competitor
would not significantly alter the market power of any other player. However, in all country
experiences it has been the case that infrastructure  sectors fall below this test -- the failure of
a service provider in  infrastructure would have a dramatic impact on the market power of
competitors. Thus competition  and regulation  are not to be seen as alternatives in sectors such
as gas, telecommunications  and electricity, but rather complimentary  to each other. 46
In infrastructure, transition in regulation  goes more to the style of regulation employed
rather than its elimination. When there is little or  no competition, in order to be effective
regulation needs to be proactive and intrusive in its style. This  is because the utility being
regulated will be in a position to exercise the power of market dominance and has little or no
45 Servicios Eiectricos del Gran Buenos Aires.
46 Though  in New  Zealand,  the  government  privatized  the  national  telecommunications  carrier  and  then  allowed
entry of private  competitors  in almost  all segments  of the market. In so doing,  reliance  has been  placed  on the
general  competition  law to moderate  the behavior  of participants.  There  is no industry-specific  regulation.23  Industry Structure and Regulation
incentive  to improve  performance.  Whether  public  or  private,  the temptation  of monopoly  profits
is usually  too great. As new entrants  are introduced  into the market  and bring  competition  to
bear, the need  for proactive  and  heavy  regulation  is thereby  diminished,  becoming  more  reactive
and defensive.  In order to illustrate  this transition,  in the telecommunications  sector one can
envisage a  proactive regulatory  regime requiring  the approval of the regulator  before an
interconnection  contract  becomes  legally  effective.  In a reactive  regulatory  regime,  the role of
the regulator  would  be limited  to facilitating  dispute  resolution  on interconnection  terms  only if
the parties  cannot  agree  as between  themselves.
A balance  needs  to be struck  between  sector  restructuring  or unbundling  and economies
of scale  for the industry.  In electricity  generation,  there  are often  little  or no economies  of scale
in packaging  power stations  together  for sale, even  where the combination  involves  a mix of
generation sources such as  hydro and thermral  plant. However, there are real technical
efficiencies  which go with an interconnected  high voltage  power grid due to the role an
interconnected  transmission  system  plays in terms of the security  and reliability  of the entire
power sector. A sudden  loss of load on one part of the interconnected  power  system,  be it due
to generator  failure  o. transmission  line  outage,  can  cause  significant  disequilibrium  to the entire
system. 47 To minimize  the risk of such  occurrences,  responsibility  for system  integrity  requires
to be assigned  to one entity which controls the central dispatch  function." These technical
efficiencies  therefore  place  limitations  on the extent  to which  the sector  may  be divided  up, and
the extension  of competition  must be such  as to be compatible  with  these  constraints.
Despite  these concerns  however,  it is now widely  recognized  that the introduction  of
competition  in generation  and supply  through  an open access  regime  is possible  without  threat
to the integrity  of the interconnected  power  system.  This is undoubtedly  due  to the  broad  success
of the electricity  restructuring  and  privatization  in Great  Britain  and, to a lesser  extent,  in Chile.
In some  cases, the benefits  of liberating  entry to the market  may go further -- it may actually
serve  to increase  system  security  by virtue  of higher  levels  of capital  investment  brought  about
by new entrants. Whether  or not this benefit arises depends  of course upon the particular
configuration  of the power system  in question.
47 This may  result  in system  splits  where  interconnection  is lost,  a mismatch  of electrical  time  and emergency
load shedding,  resulting  in brown  outs or blackl  outs.
4" System  dispatch  involves  the scheduling  and calling  up of generation  in merit  order, after  taking  account
of transmission  constraints  and other outages,  in order to meet expected  demand  on a continuous  basis. This is
because  electricity  cannot  be stored  in commercial  quantities,  and  so  supply  and  demand  must  be perfectly  matched
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To what extent can one rely upon the
contestability  of  particular  infrastructure  Liberalization  may  well  benefit  rather  than  detract
markets to act as an ally to regulation and a  from the integrity  of  an interconnected  power
substitute  to  actual  competition?  The  system. In a country such as  Peru, where the
majority  of  generation  capacity  is in the  north  of the
existence  of  regulatory  systems  (which  country  and  demand  is in the  south  and central  belt,
invariably require the grant of a permission,  privatization  and  liberalization  of the  power  sector
license or  concession)  of themselves weaken  should  result in new thermal  generation  capacity
the impact of  contestability;  there  will most  being  built  more quickly  than  would  otherwise  be
likely  be  some  potential  entrants  who  may  the case. As new  thermal  generation  may  be sited
closer  to centers  of demand  for reasons  of fuel wish to enter the market to compete, but may
supply, they will serve to  balance the total
not do  so  because they  fail,  for whatever  interconnected  system.
reason,  to hold the  relevant permission or
license. The regulatory  regime itself therefore  9 System  integrity  advantages  of liberalization:  Peru
represents  a  barrier  to  free  entry  and  an
apparent limitation on competition..  There is therefore an inherent dilemma in the sense that
where there is a natural monopoly, such as the transportation and distribution pipeline systems
in the natural gas industry or the transmission and distribution wires in electricity, in order to
promote or at least facilitate competition,  a regulatory regime is necessary. The validity of the
contestable markets theory is therefore  limited in infrastructure sectors for this reason; the threat
of the new entrant  on the incumbent being limited not only by the existence of the regulatory
instrument  itself, but  also by the longevity of such instrument. 49
4  For example,  in both  power  and telecommunications  in Great  Britain,  the relevant  licenses  are for long
periods;  usually  25 years and termination  requires  10 years noticc.  This renders  the license, authorization  or
concession  a very  real asset in the hands  of the utility.  By way  of contrast,  in Argentina  the system  of re-bidding
for concessions  held  every  seven  years  seems  to be an attempt  to lower  the  barrier  represented  by the  existence  of
the  instrument  itself  by affording  an opportunity  to new  entrants  to outbid  for  the  existing  concession.  One  potential
drawback  to this approach  is that existing  concession  holders  will  seek  a pay-back  period  for capital  investments
within  the seven  year period  before  re-bidding  in order to minimize  risk.25  Industry  Structure  and Regulation
HI.  Regulation and Regulatory options
Models for industry structure may  exclude  competition,  contain  a mix of competition  and
a dominant  national provider or may permit extensive  competition  through  radical restructuring.
The regulatory  framework which results will depend  directly on the nature  of the model adopted.
Nevertheless, the regulatory processes and institutions which result also are dictated by the
existing 1-:gfal,  political and social realities of the country.'  The success of private utilities
depends  on the relationships  between  the regulatory  regime introduced  in the reform process and
the country's branches of government;  judiciary, legislature and executive.
Regulation is of course not new. It has long been a tool of policy-makers,  being used
along  with ownership  as a means of control. Historically, regulation  would  often be used to erect
barriers against new entrants to the market, thus preserving the monopoly  position enjoyed by
the state-owned enterprise -- for example, in the case of telecommunications  in the United
Kingdom, it was only the deregulation  that came with privatization  which allowed competition
in the supply of customer premises equipment, making available  a wider range of equipment to
customers; a range of equipment which  had long been enjoyed and expected  by customers in the
United States.
The scope of this "old style" regulation  varies quite markedly from country to country.
In the context of a state-owned  enterprise where direct control is exercised by politicians over
such matters as the capital investment  decisions  of the enterprise, its prices and its staffing levels
--  matters which would othervise be dealt with by management  in a truly competitive  market -
- regulation often deals with little more than setting technical  standards which operate so-  as to
prohibit, or at best, significantly  hinder competition.  Even where prices are within the scope of
regulation, substantial  cross-subsidization  is a common  feature and the relevant ministry retains
within its grasp the right to intervene  when deemed politically  expedient.
In some cases, old style regulation  was limited to prices (tariff setting) or technical and
safety matters only without covering prices at all.  Ownership is the control mechanism that
covers all other areas. On the other hand, some forms of this "old style" regulation cover a
wider range of topics, such as incentives  for efficiency,  customer  service  standards or investment
and system planning.
50  B. Levy and P. Spiller Regiulation.  Institutions,  and Commitment  in Telecommunications:  A Comparative
Analysis of Five Country Studies, World Bank 1993. This paper illustraLes  by reference to Argentina, Chile,
Jamaica, the Philippines  and Grcat Britain the importance  of designing regulation  to the local environment.Industry Structure and Regulation  26
Regardless of scope, the nature of "old style" regulation as a method of control -- lying
in the shadow of the law and often based on a large measure of ministerial discretion -- is such
that clarity and precision  are starkly absent. Indeed, clarity or transparency is not considered of
great importance from the control point of view, since regulation and ownership are in fact
fused. This however  only serves to leave enterprise management  in doubt as to the scope of their
authority in decision making; a dilemma which is particularly acute if the management is
expected to behave in a commercial manner.
In the process of designing regulatory reform, it is important to determine the scope of
any "old style" regulation which touches upon the sector concerned before devising a  new
regulatory regime. There are two reasons . First,  where the scope of existing "old style"
regulation is wide, the change to autonomous  regulation may be seen as basically a transfer of
responsibilities from the ministry. 5'  In such cases, it will be easier to establish the necessary
conceptual acceptance of an autonomous Regulator. An example of this is the acceptance in
principle of an independent  authority for the gas sector in the legislation  relating to the Argentine
gas privatization. Secondly, it is important  to understand  the legal basis on which the "old style"
regulation is posited in order to be fully appraised of the detail as to how the existing law needs
to  be amended. This  is a step around which a short-cut should not be taken (especially in
countries where the process for primary legislation  is arduous)  as short-cuts will almost certainly
result in inconsistent laws, which in turn results in a requirement  for curative legislation to be
passed  to  "fill  the gaps". 5 2 Just  as  effective regulatory design requires  analysis of  the
institutional capacity of the country in question, likewise it cannot be carried out effectively in
isolation of  the existing substantive laws which provide support mechanisms to  the  new
framework.
It is however  in the context of privatization  that regulation takes on a new role. Not only
does it play a more cer.tral  role, but it also obtains a wider base. The process of privatization
or significant private sector participation involves  a recasting  of govemment's role from that of
a producer to that of regulator. Control, in the form of regulation, aims at the protection of
customers and the promotion of competition. Regulation therefore becomes the new "border"
between government and the industry.
From the regulatory viewpoint, two processes are involved:
51  Experience in countries such as Mexico, Morocco  and the Philippines  has shown that building regulatory
capacity within the sectoral ministry  itself underestimates  the administrative  constraints  of establishing  an effective
regulator. This is discussed in more detail below.
52 An example of this is the Water Industry Act 1991 in Great Britain, legislation which was required due to
a lack of clarity when the original Water Act was passed to facilitate the speedy privatization of that sector.27  Industry  Structure  and Regulation
1.  Deregulation.
The Hungarian  Constitution  and Civil Code  states
This  process involves the review of  that certain  assets,  such  as roads  and transmission
the traditional regulatory regime with the aim  systems,  are exclusive  state property. The Civil
of removin  barr  o.  TCode  expressly  prohibits  divestiture  of certain  state of  removing barrers  to  competition. The process  of dassets.  For  example,  under  §173  of the  Civil  Code,
process  of deregulation  is  not  limited  however  alny  conveyance  of erclusive  stote  property  is null
to  the  abolition  or  amendment of  rules,  and  void  in law. The Hungarian  Concession  Act
procedures or stated codes of practice which  lists  a  description  of  both  assets  and  activities  which
are  constituted  in  secondary  legislation,  are exclusive  to the  State.
directives  or  lesser  - legal  sources. 53 The
deregulation  process is wider. It also involves  10  Legal exclusiviry:  ewamples  from Hungary
a review process which may have an impact
directly upon the primary legislation or Civil Code, in some cases even upon the Constitution
of the country in question. This process could entail, for example, amending the Constitution
to allow the private sector to participate  where the Constitution  enshrines the assets of the sector
or the activity of carrying out the functions of that sector as exclusive to the State.
Deregulation  is also required where, for example in telecommunications,  the laws  provide
a licensing function to the national  carrier, which itself acts as a barrier to new entrants. Prior
to privatization, British Telecom's approval  was required for all customer premises' equipment,
a control function which was removed from British Telecom at privatization and vested in the
British Standards Authority. In the coal industry, the same issue arises when the law requires
the national mining entity to license potential competitors  for methane extraction.
Part of the deregulation process will also involve a review of those laws which touch
upon the activities of the sector concerned but which are not sector specific. The specific law
reforming the sector in question will usually be set in the context of these laws, such as the
general competition  or anti-trust legislation.  This process involves  the review of any exemptions
conferred upon the State owned  enterprise. It will also involve  the removal of preferential legal
immunities, such as the legal immunities  from liability on both tort and contract enjoyed by
British Telecom before privatization.
The precise barriers which constitute prohibitions (or,  at the very  least, significant
impediments) to  the participation of  new entrants will vary according to the nature of the
particular market concerned. The regulations may draw a distinction between networks and
53 For  example,  secondary  legislation  such  as Statutory  Instruments,  or Govemment  or Ministerial  Decrees,
published  practice  notes  of a particular  Ministry  or regulatory  agency,  procedures  and rules  of a technical  standards
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services, with an express prohibition against  the establishment  of a competitive  network but with
more indirect barriers to service competition.  The barriers are not always direct. explicit and
negatively  stated.  For  example,  in  the  market  for  the  supply  of  equipment  in
telecommunications,5Y  the barriers may exist as an express prohibition against the provision of
such equipment except by the national telecom or its subsidiaries. The same barriers may exist
in  an indirect manner. Potential new entrants to the  market for equipment supply may be
hindered by  virtue of regulations which confer upon the national telecom a  right of  prior
approval or consent on technical grounds before their equipment  may be connected to any part
of the national system. 55
The cumulative effect of regulation  should be noted. A single restriction or barrier may
not constitute a particularly onerous impediment, but the cumulative  effect of many indirect
barriers can be such as to deter active participation  by new entrants.
2.  Re-regulation.
Coupled with this deregulation process is the development of new regulatory regimes,
or re-regulation,  which is aimed at facilitating  competition  and setting the new environment for
the industry by emulating market mechanisms within the confines of accepted policy. The re-
regulation process necessitates  the reallocation  of responsibility  for the supervision of technical
and  safety  regulation,  usually from  the  national service  provider to  the  regulator.  This
reallocation process includes the complete separation of the previous regulatory functions and
the operational  functions of the national service providers. 56
The re-regulation process usually involves the passing of  the  necessary legislation
establishing the Regulator, conferring industry watchdog powers upon it. The re-regulation
process involves  the development  of a tailored regulatory  structure with a hioh degree of sectoral
54  This includes  customer premises  equipment  or apparatus,  private  automatic  branch  exchanges  (PABXs),  and
public switching  systems or exchanges.
55 It was a legal challenge in the United  States under anti-trust law to such a requirement  imposed by AT&T
which led ultimately to the break-up of Bell Telephone and the rapid expansion  of competitors  such as MCI and
Sprint.
56 This separation is necessary to avoid the national provider controlling access to the market by potential
competitors, for example in relation to the approval  of the technical  and safety standards  of competitors' customer
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orientation.5 7 Before embarking on such a process however, an important prerequisite to
regulatory design is the analysis of overall institutional  capacity.
Insti  onal Capacity
The choices available  to policy-makers  in the design of re-regulation  are restricted  by the
institutional capacity of the branches of government in country in question. 5 This capacity is
made up of the legislative  and executive institutions,  focusing  on the formal procedures for law-
making and the appointment  of legislators, the bodies of govermnent  which implement and the
relationship between these functions.
The institutional  capacity existing within the country shapes the placement  of the core
regulatory rules within the spectrum of available mechanisms.  The best option in terms of the
balance between flexibility  and certainty would  encompass  enabling  legislation  which  establishes
the principles and parameters within which regulatory  institutions  may exercise  certain  delineated
discretionary powers to allow flexible implementation  of regulatory policy.  Where there is a
distinct  separation of powers  between the  legislature and  executive and  there  is  limited
experience of regulatory institutions, the rules can be set out in detail in the laws creating the
regulatory scheme.;  Examples of this approach  which have succeeded  are to be found in Chile
and Peru.
Conversely, where the executive is dominant and arbitrary administrative  actions are
common, it may be possible to create an enclave body of rules in a license or concession
contract. The ability of this mechanism to satisfy investors as to the stability of the contractual
regime assumes a capable  and independent  judiciary to arbitrate disputes  between  the government
and the service provider, the judiciary having a reputation for impartiality  and enforcement of
private property rights and contracts (including  enforcement  against uncompensated  goverrnent
expropriation).'  Other important factors include the role of informal rules of custom and
social interest which serve as restraints on arbitrary action by individuals  and institutions.
57 This is not to preclude the institutional  option  of a core non-sectoral  regulatory  authority  with sub-divisions
that are sector specific, a structure which is common at the state level in the United States and which is being
explored by a number of developing countries, such as Thailand and Indonesia.
58 B. Levy and P. Spiller (1993).
s9 Though at some cost to flexibility to adapt to new innovations in the sector, especially in the case of
telecommunications.
6  If the judiciary lacks this capacity, the Bank may provide assistance with wider judicial reform, as in
Venezuela: Judicial Infrastructure  Project (Loan No. 3514 VE).Industry Structure and Regulation  30
Reliance  upon  project-specific rules  concerning  pricing,  quality  of  service  and
competition to be embodied in a  license or concession contract carries some dangers if the
government lacks the skills and bargaining leverage to ensure that the resulting contract fairly
balances public and  private  interests. If  the  contract  is unbalanced, the  government will
ultimately face public pressures to utilize  other tools such as taxation or price controls to ensure
that the  public interest is  protected. The Bank can assist here by  supporting institutional
development and providing funding for technical assistance.
The Role of Regulaion
With full or majority privatization,  ownership no longer exists as a mechanism  of control
for government, except of course to the extent that the State retains a stake in the privatized
company and  can  exercise shareholder rights  commensurate with  either  the  size  of  that
shareholding under the general Company Law of the country in question or where the State
retains  a  "golden share",  in  which case there  is  negative control 6'  still  present through
ownership.
Regulation  therefore affords a means of fostering an environment  which not only enables
potential new entrants access to the market, but which also provides a means of replicating  the
effects of competition as closely as possible. The aim is to prevent abuse of a dominant market
position by a private monopoly or by a public monopoly  against new entrants.
Although regulatory regimes are diverse, there are certain common  features which make
it possible to classify them by the frameworkl  adopted and the functions they perform. These
common features are:
a  the  establishmcnt of  a  new  Regulator which is charged  with  administering
economic regulation and consumer protection, usually on a sectoral basis. This
regulator may be an autonomous agency, but equally may constitute a  non-
ministerial government department. Experience has shown that independence
confers advantages,  namely  investor  confidence  in the regulatory  framework being
operated in such a way as to minimize political interference;
61 Negative  control  in the sense  of only being  able  to block or vote  against  certain  corporate  actions,  such  as
a take-over  or merger. Another  approach  is to define  enduring  service  standards  or performance  targets  in the
charter  of the utility  before  privatization  and to structure  v3ting  rights  such that any later amendment  to those
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*  the law empowers the Regulator by delegating authority. The duties of  the
Regulator are also spelt out, and security of tenure conferred;
*  the comerstone of  economic or  price regulation is established, although the
particular forn  of economic  regulation adopted may differ markedly; and
*  the authority to review the terms upon which industry participants operate is
clarified,  such as the policing of  license terms for interconnection and other
matters affecting competition.
Regulation may be  categorized by  structure,  people, procedure  and  price  control
methodology:
(a)  Structure
The structure of the industry which is adopted will have an impact  upon the effectiveness
of the Regulator in the performance of its duties. Experience has shown that full vertically
integrated utilities are the most difficult to regulate, largely due to lack of information flows
from regulated  enterprise to regulator, but also due to the limitations  on the opportunities made
available to  competition. A lesson has been learned the hard way -- competition assists the
regulator in performing its functions.
(b)  People
The Regulator may be constituted as a commission or panel of regulators or may be a
single appointee with the appropriate staff. In Great Britain the regulator of each privatized
industry is an individual  appointed by the relevant Minister; the Director General of Electricity
Supply in the case of electricity. He is supported by OFFER, the Office  of Electricity Regulation
which is a non-ministerial government department. The British approach to Regulators has
therefore placed a great deal of emphasis upon the appointed Director General. This focuses
responsibility, although it could also provide scope for a  strong personality to  color the
regulatory  process. A suitably qualified individual  with a clear sense of his brief may, however,
prove a more effective and responsive regulator than a panel or commission of appointees. In
the developing country context, given the importance  of infrastructure to the country and the
need for transparency, the commission  approach is to be preferred despite drawbacks of slower
decision-making. In any event, the importance of "the right person for the job"  is not to be
overlooked. The Regulator should also have access to advisors with strong expertise in theIndustry  Structure  and  Regulation  32
industry in order to permit quicker resolution of debates and to facilitate  efficient operation of
the Regulator as a whole.  _
The security of tenure to be afforded to the regulators is clearly an important issue, and
since the Regulator often is quasi-judicial  in its functions  and powers, appointment  and removal
procedures akin to those for the judiciary provide a possible model, assuming that the judiciary
is sufficiently separated from the other branches of government. The number of  years of
appointment 6 and the parameters within which they are to operate should be clearly stated
within the law. In addition, the law should lay down in what circumstances  the regulator may
be removed from office. Typical grounds for removal are bankruptcy, crimes of dishonesty or
gross misconduct, similar to those in relation to the judiciary. If the area of tenure is left as a
matter of ministerial discretion with no clear legal rules, the independence  of the regulator will
be undermined. Equally, these rules and procedures should be publicly known. Thought should
also be given to the nature of disclosure requirements  to the legislature as well as the public at
large as to the outside interests of the regulators, with a prohibition on any financial interest in
the regulated enterprises.
In practice it is not enough to put ia place a regulatory system without assurance that the
privatized enterprise will be actively policed and that there is the will to promote or  at least
facilitate competition. New entrants need to be comforted that the regulators have sufficient
commitment and capacity in these respects before they will be willing to enter the market with
any vigor. Equally, investors in the privatization of the state enterprise need to be confident as
to the ability of the regulators to withstand, within the law, the pressures placed upon them by
politicians to focus on political rather than commercial  objectives. A commitment  to competition
in the relevant sector is important  therefore not only at the ministerial level, but also on the part
of the regulators.
The issue of accountability  is often raised. Accountability,  or rather a fear of the loss of
accountability, is usually the main argument put forward for not establishing an autonomous
Regulator. The necessary balance  between accountability  and independence  can best be achieved
by a combination of judicial review of individual  decisions  and of transparency in the regulatory
function.  The Regulator should operate under a  procedural framework which allows  any
interested party,  including the government or consumer groups, to provide inputs into the
decision-making process. The Regulator should prepare a written statement of the reasons for
62 The appointment  of regulators  may  be the responsibility  of the legislature,  the head of State or prime
minister  or the  line  ministry.  In each  case, the important  feature  is the extent  to which  the  regulators  are secure  in
that appointment,  and in this regard,  appointment  by a wider  consensus  such  as the legislature  serves  to assist  that
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its decisions, both to enhance  public  onfidence  in the transparency  of the process and also to
facilitate  judicial review. The regulatory  scheme  should also include opportunities  for review  by
the legislature of the work of the Regulator. A useful approach is to require the Regulator to
submit a report, preferably annually, to the legislature on its activities and on any significant
competition issues which may have been encountered  and which may require legislative  action.
In this way there is an opportunity  for public discussion  of the perfonnance of the Regulator,
while at the same time preserving the independence  of the Regulator on a day-to-day basis.
In certain cases, the Regulator may deliver its report to  the legislature through the
sectoral ministry. In order to ensure that the relevant  ministry acts as a "conduit"  rather than a
"filter", the law should also require that the regulators publish a full unabridged  copy of any
annual report submitted to the Iine  ministry and that written instructions  from the ministry may
be referred to in public.
Whatever the legal safeguards, in practice of  course, the personalities involved will
materially affect the true functional  independence  of the Regulator and its accountability  to the
legislature.
(c)  Procedure
The nature of the procedures to be adopted and utilized by the regulators will impact
greatly upon their efficiency  in carrying out their functions. The approach  of due process, open
hearings and rights of appeal adopted in the United  States has advantages  in that all interested
parties have an opportunity to participate and there is transparency in decision making. The
disadvantage  to this approach is the cost of decision-making,  both in terms of money and time
(aside from costly lobbying  on the part of interest groups  and the regulated  enterprises), although
the  gains  obtained from  transparent decision-making procedures  are  seen  by  many  as
outweighing  those costs. Conversely,  in Great Britain  the view is taken that  expeditious  decision-
making is paramount, resulting  in procedures which  are more discretionary, resulting in closed
negotiation and limited rights of appeal. Nevertheless,  the strong impartial  judiciary provides
recourse  under the existing procedural and substantive rules governing judicial review of
administrative decisions.
The availability of judicial review by the courts will depend not only on  legislative
enactment, but also upon the internal administrative  procedures adopted and published by the
Regulator. Where these  procedures  lay down in great detail  the consultation  process (for example
the number of days to elapse between one step and the next) or where there are detailed rules
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judicial review is easier to instigate  on the basis of thc failure to comply with a procedural step,
which may result in a dec,ision  being overturned. As a  result, procedural steps undertaken
thereafter based on  that decision may then be declared void. Conversely, an absence of
administrative procedures is likel.' to result in legitimate interests complaining of being denied
the opportunity to make their views known when a decision does not favor their interests. The
courts will equally have greater difficulty in carrying out a judicial  review the wider the
discretionary nature of the regulator's powers. Clearly there is a trade off involved between
speed of decision making and procedure and a balance needs to be struck in  context.
(d)  Price  methodology
The comerstone of economic regulation is the control of prices paid by the ultimate
consumer as well as by the different businesses  or divisions which go to make up the regulated
company  and where those divisions relate to third party users of their systems or services.
There are, however, different  methods
Telefonos  de  Mexico is the main provide-  of  to  achieve  price  control.  One  approach,
telecommunications  services  in Mexico.  To date,  which has a long track record in the United
only  private  networks,  cquipment  sales  and  cellular  States, is that of regulating  the rate of return.
are open to competition.  Telefonos  de Merico  was  T
privatized  by direct  sale  in 1990.  It is regulated  by  The  key  feature of  this  approach IS the
the  Secretariat  of  Conumunications,  utilizing  an  RPI-  periodic  review  of the tariffs  which  the  utility
x price cap similar  to that applied  to British  wishes to bring into effect. This involves  the
Telecom.  Those  services  which  are outside  the  examination of the utility's operating costs,
specified  basket  covered  by the formula,  such  as  capital employed  and cost of capital during an
cellular  telephony,  are  therefore  unregulated.  agreed test period in order to d. ermine a fair
In  addition  to economic  regulation,  the  company  is  rate of retur.  This information, together  with
subject  to constraints  and  competition  goals  under  assumptions as  to  demand,  is  used  to
its Concession.  The legal  monopoly  it presently  calculate the total revenue requirement, and
enjoys  over  all fixed-link  telephony  is to terminate  from this requirement the levul of tariff is
in 1996,  when  new  entrants  may  offer  long  distance  determined. In order to avoid d-crimination,
services.  However,  this monopoly  is contingent  an examination  of each tariff for each service
upon  Telefonos  de Mexico  meeting  stated  network takes  place  involving  the  allocation  of expansion  targets;  a mechanism  which  acts  as an
incentive  to invest  and  expand.  common costs. Once approved, the tariffs
generally remain  in  force  until  the  utility
11 Mexico:  The regulation  of Telefonos  de Mexico  seeks a review. There are many variations  on
the theme, but these are the fundamentals  of
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One of the criticisms of rate of return price regulation, being essentially a "cost plus"
approach, is that the regulated enterprise has little incentive to make efficiency gains. As a
result, Great Britain has adopted a modified form of rate of return regulation. This modified
form, referred to as RPI-x, allows the utility to make any changes it wishes to its prices during
a predetermined period of four to five years,  provided that the average price of a specified
basket of its services does not increase at a rate greater than RPI-x, where RPI is the rate of
inflation and x is a factor determined as representing the projected efficiency gains over the
predetermined period.
The relative advantages of the RPI-x approach over rate of return regulation may be
sumunarized  as:
*  RPI-x is less likely to result in inefficiency  and "gold plating" since the utility may retain
gains which are made above x. Since part of the efficiency  gain is passed on to customers
in x, prices tend to be lower than they would be under ratz of return regulation.
*  RPI-x affords the utility greater flexibility to  adjust its pricing structures within the
confines of the basket of regulated  services. Services outside  of the basket are, generally,
not regulated.
- RPI-x is generally simpler to operate on the part of the Regulator and the urility since
it does not require the detailed calculations and verification of inputs associated with
calculating the total revenue requirement in rate based regulation.
Despite these advantages, there is some doubt as to the transferability of the British price
regulation model to  developing countries,  given the particular characteristics of the overall
institutional capacity as described above. The British model confers a substantial degree of
discretion on the  regulator which is counterbalanced by surrounding institutions. 63 Chilean
benchrnark regulation or more traditional rate of return regulation, such as  in Jamaica, are
posited on specific and detailed rules which may be easier to  implement in the developing
country context in the sense that there is less reliance on the support mechanisms of overall
institutional capacity to control discretion.
63 For example,  the  regulators  cannot  unilaterally  amend  license  terms  without  the  agreement  of the  regulated
utility.  If the  utility  does  not agrec  with  the  proposal,  reference  is to be made  to the Mergers  and  Monopolies
Commission  for recommendation.  Even then, the Secretary  of  State may veto the recommendation.
(Telecommunications  Act 1984,  SecLions  15  et seq.)Industry Structure and Regulation  36
Why  establish  an autonomous  Regulator?
Jamaica's experience with regulation has been
This  is a key question  which  is often  mixed.  At  first, the regulatory  regime  was  based  on
either overlooked or simply misunderstood.  a system  of licenses  which were highly detailed,
specifying  rates  of return.  The  judiciary  was to be
In short,  the  independence  of the Regulator  is  speiyn  tso  em  h  uiir  aob
the enforcer  of these  commitments  -- such that in
important  in order to avoid what is commonly  1962 the new government  perceived  the license
referred  to as  "regulatory  capture",  whereby  system as an undue constraint on parliamentary
the regulators  fall  under  undue  influence of  sovereignty.  As  a result,  the  Janaican Public  Utility
either  the govermnent  or  the industry  which  Commission  was  established  in 1966,  modelled  on
they are supposed to be regrulating  on  an  the US approach. The lack of institutional capacity
arm's length basis.  and  support  mechanisms  to provide  balance  resulted
in clashes  between  the  commission  and  the  utilities,
culminating  in nationalization.  The effect was a
In  certain  ownership  and  marked reduction  in investment  and increase in
accountability  structures  between  the  inefficiency.  With privatization  in the late 1980s,
goverunent  and  national  providers  of  which rerurned  ro the detailed  license  enforced  by
thejudiciary,  the  result  has  been  a significant  influx
iynonfrastructure,  regulath  mioni  iay  b  ply  of investment  and  system  expansion.  (Levy,  Spiller
synonymous  with  ministerial  control,  1993)
exercised  by  ownership.  This  structure  was
often  used  in  the  case  of  Post  &  12 Regulatory  experience  of Jarnaica
Telecommunications  and  in certain  countries
still is the structure  used,  for example  in India.'
Where  public corporations  are used as the entity  to provide  services,  the accountability
structure  may  be established  in  such  a  way  as  to  recognize  a discrete  regulatory  function.
Usually,  this  discrete  function  is  with  a  limited  regulatory  brief  however,  reporting  to  the
relevant  ministry  on a  regular  basis.  This  particular  structure,  or  variations  close to this,  are
common  in developing  countries.0  In this  particular  accountability  structure,  the  regulatory
brief  is  confined  to  economic  regulation  and  customer  service  standards  with  the  ministry
retaining  direct  control  over  investment  planning  and  incentivization.  In  practice,  the actual
scope of the regulatory brief varies from industry to industry in different countries.  For example,
within the ministry  responsible  for electricity,  the regulators  may be no more than a directorate,
department  or division  of that ministry.
64  Except  for intemational  services  which  are  provided  by VSNL  and  local  services  in Delhi  and  Bombay  which
are provided  by MTNL  (both  corporatized  entities),  the Department  of Telecommunications  under  the Ministry  of
Communications  provides  all services.  The main  operator  is therefore  a government  department.
- 65  For exarnple  in the electricity  sector,  EGAT  in Thailand  which  is a wholly  owned  government  corporation,
or the National  Railway  Corporation  in Korea.37  Industry  Structure and Regulation
It should be noted that in both the departmental  structLure  and the public corporation
structure, the ministerial  role is significant;  the ministry  is both  judge and jury. There is wide
scope for political  influence  upon  management  decisions,  fundamentally  affecting  the ability  of
management  to conduct the business in a commercial  manner. The temptation  to political
interference  is particularly  strong in infrastructure,  even where the regulatory  brief includes
economic  regulation,  because  governments  consider  that price increases  contribute  to inflation
and impact  adversely  upon  their electoral  standing.  This  has led to extensive  cross-subsidies  and
price increase  suppression  against  which  the regulator  can do little  due to dependency.
The desire  for control  goes  beyond  prices. Govermment  involvement  generally  in sector
policies  is a reflection  of its desire to control the implementation  of policy such as personnel
operations, investment  and borrowing. These desires make both the establishment  of an
autonomous  Regulator  and the maintenance  of that independence  difficult  to achieve.
Conversely,  an autonomous  Regulator  places the regulators  firmly between  the ministry
and the utility. The management  of the utility  are thus  able  to focus  on commercial  rather than
political  objectives  and to account  appropriately  to shareholders.  Such a utility  operates  under
the normal company  laws applicable  to private enterprises  and is independently  audited. The
management  produces  full  financial  statements  as part of their  accountability  to the shareholders.
In this idealized  structure, the utility's shareholders  may also be consumers.  Consumers  and
third party users will make their views known directly to the legislature, via lobbying  for
example. The privatized  utility therefore operates under a web of checks and balances of
accountability  to shareholders  and consumers,  but avoids  ministerial  interference  in operations
and investment  decisions.
Given the importance  of infrastructure  sectors, there will typically  be some form of
regulatory instrument, such as a license or  concession,  which permits or  requires certain
activities  to be carried on in the ordinary  course  of business.  The license  or concession  will be
granted or contracted  between  the govermment  and the utility at the time of privatization  or
corporatization.  It will however  be policed  by the Regulator  under the terms of the powers  and
duties given to the regulators  in the law and the regulatory  brief. In the developing  country
context, caution  is required  on the part of the government  in framing  the terms of the license
or concession  in order to minimize  the risks of regulatory  capture  by the regulated  enterprises.
For example, where the government  is inclined  to invasive  rather than light-handed  regulation
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commercial  regulatory  capture  is  greatly  increased ultimately reducing  regulatory
effectiveness.66
Establishing  an autonomous  Regulator  in this context  means  thait:
(a) The Regulator has exclusive authority to  oversee perfomiance by the utility, so that the
standards to which the utility will be held accountable  are relevant and publicly known.
Where an enterprise operates under a concession  contract, the terms of that legal
instrument  cover a wide range of important  issues, such as performance-  targets, customer
service standards and pricing. In addition, within the ambit of the concession  contract are
included issues which one might expect to be dealt with by the Regulator  under a licensing
regime.  In common  law jurisdictions  there is a debate  about the legal nature of licenses  in this
context  which is beyond  the scope  of this paper, but which plays  a role. In short, the debate  is
to what extent a license is a contract (rather than an authorization  or simple administrative
instrument)  in the sense  that consent  is required  of the regulated  enterprise  before amendment
can be made, and what steps need to be taken for its amendment.  To the extent that it is a
contract, the Regulator  can play a significant  role in checking  unilateral  changes  to conditions
on the part of the ministry or  public authority which granted the license. In civil law
jurisdictions, concessions or admininrrative  agreements  are somewhat  different in that the
government  effectively  has a residual  right to unilaterally  modify  the termns  of the concession
without  the prior agreement  of the concessionaire,  although  this right in administrative  law is
generally  restricted  to unusual  circumstances  which  give rise to intervention  in order to protect
the public interest, followed  by compensation  to the concessionaire  where appropriate.
An example  of this role is seen in the context  of the recent furor in Great  Britain  arising
from the announcement  by the Department  of Trade & lndustry that some 30 coal pits would
be  scheduled for  immediate  closure. The political backlash in Parliament called for the
overturning  of contracts and investment  decisions taken by many of the newly privatized
electricity  companies  to build new  Combined  Cycle  Gas Turbines  -- referred to as "the  dash for
gas" which  took  place  immediately  after privatization.  Opponents  argued  that this "dash  for  gas"
had significantly  reduced  demand  for coal.
66  Unduly  onerous  reporting  requirements  upon  the regulated  enterprise,  such  as the  direct involvenent  of the
regulator  with the management  accounts,  purchasing  policy, staffing  decisions  and investment  criteria  which  are
placed  in the concession  or license  at inception  due to a lack  of trust  of the operator  is ultimately  self-defeating.
Better  light-handed  but effective  regulation  than heavy  handed  invasive  regulation  that is not sustainable  due to
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In order  to maintain  a higher  level  of demand  for coal  in electricity  generation,  politicians
called for OFFER, the Regulator  for the electricity  industry,  to be persuaded  to rule that the
contracts for the purchase of electricity  from these planned gas fired power stations were
"contrary to the license obligations  to purchase  electricity  from the most economic  source".
OFFER  undertook  a detailed  review  in December  1992,  and ruled  that the power  contracts  were
within  the terms of the electricity  companies'  obligation  of economic  purchasing;  the contracts
were to stand. The regulator  then came under  enormous  pressure  from government,  which  led
to a further review in February 1993 in which the regulator is clear in his defence  of his
independence  from energy policy issues unconnected  with the electricity  industry. Professor
Littlechild,  the Regulator, states in this further review that "the  development  and  operation  of
an energy  policy is properly the function of the govemment. My own  powers and duties are
limited  to the e.ectricity  sector. The Electricity  Act 19897' sets out my  functions  and requires
me to take account  of other considerations  relevant  to electricity".  However,  the issue  of lesser
demand  for coal  is not relevant  where  the electricity  companies  have  acted  within  the parameters
of their Licenses. The regulator was able to insist that government  take responsibility  for
addressing  public interest issues  through  general  energy  policy 6 , rather than dealing indirectly
with those issues  through consideration  of legally  inadmissible  factors in regulatory  decisions.
On the other side of  the equation, the regulator must be capable of  maintaining
independence  from those it regulates.  It may  be argued  that the establishment  of an autonomous
Regulator,  especially  withsector  specific  orientation  lends  itself  to being  captured  by commercial
interests.  On  the other  hand,  the ability  of autonomous  regulators  to access  information  improves
since the regulated  enterprises  know  that information  divulged  is less likely  to be used against
them politically.  There is, in fact, no evidence  to show that autonom,v  is regulators  are more
prone to regulatory  capture from those they regulate than regulators from within a sectoral
ministry. On the contrary, the overall success of regulation  has been more limited in the
experience  of sector reforms where autonomy  was not established  for the regulators.69
67 The restructuring  and privatization  law for the  sector.
68  From  the shareholders'  point  of view, it could  be argued  that interference  with the freedom  to contract
within the regulatory  framework  wjuld represent  a change  to) the 'regulatory  bargain  which was struck at
privatization,  being  the  description  of the regulatory  framework  and the terms  of the Licenses  as contained  in the
Prospectus.  The  Prospectus  is the  document  upon  which  the investors  rely  when  forming  ajudgement  as to whether
or not to purchase  shares  in the companies  as they  are floated  on the stock  market.  The  decision  as to the balance
between  the public  interest  (in the form  of the government's  overall  energy  policy)  and regulatory  independence
needs  to be established  at privatization  as part of the "regulatory  bargain' between  the govemment,  shareholders
and the industry.
69 For example  in Morocco,  the Philippines  and Venezuela.  In the case of Venezuela,  the reform  of the
telecommunications  sector  led to the ceation of a regulator  within  the sectoral  ministry,  maldkg  the appointment
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(b) The regulators  must have security  of tenure,  a clear brief and the Regulator  must  possess
skilled  staff with  an understgnding  of the industry  which  they  regulate,  making  dispute  resolution
less costly  and more  focused.
Security  of appointment  is essential  to the ability  of the regulators  to be autonomous  and
de-linked from the political cycle. There is a balance to be achieved  insofar as long term
appointments,  while  providing  the regulators  with  confidence  to use their  autonomy  against  short
term political  pressures,  at the same'  time  increases  the risk of regulatory  capture  by the industry
being regulated.  The Regulator  need  not be experts  themselves  in the industry  they regulate,  but
the Regulator  needs  to be staffed  with  the appropriate  skill mix to be able  to comprehend  readily
the operators'  actions  and submissions.  Suffice  to say that speedy  resolution  of industry  specific
issues is of benefit  to all concerned,  not only in terms of money costs, but also management
time.
Closely  related  is the ability  of the Regulator  to hire its own staff and fund  its activities.
These practical matters  directly impact  the effectiveness  of the regulatory  oversight.  Staffing
should not be within the restrictions of the civil service and public sector pay constraints  to
ensure high  calibre  staff. Further, funding  should  be from sources  aside  from  the appropriations
process of central budget (such as a levy on turnover of licensees) in order to avoid the
Regulator  being cash starved  into submission.  At the same time, checks  do need  to be placed
on what may become  a swollen  bureaucracy,  and account  to the legislature  through, say, the
Ministry of Finance  or the Auditor-General  may be given as to how the independently  raised
funds were actually  spent in accordance  with the regulatory  brief.
(c) Major investors  and institutional  shareholders  will have greater confidence  in the utility
knowing  that it operates  under  a strong  autonomous  Regulator.
The view is usually taken by investors  that an autonomous  Regulator  is less prone to
political  interference  and therefore  the business  in which  they have  invested  is less likely to be
required to meet political  or social objectives  which were not originally  contemplated.  This
confidence  will tend to affect  the share  price in a positive  way  and consequently  affect  the ability
of the company  to raise necessary  capital. In short, there is investor  confidence  in the rule of
law. One of the factors in evaluating  potential  investnent is political  risk, and the absence  of
an autonomous  Regulator  operating  in a transparent  framework  will increase  the private  sector's
perception  of the presence  of that risk.41  Industry Structure and Regulation
Regulation  from within the sectoral  minishy
The establishment of a regulatory function for infrastructure activities has become over
recent years a  central theme of the policy dialogue between the World Bank and member
countries,  and has become a  feature of many technical assistance and reform loans. These
functions have, in some cases, been established  within the sectoral ministry, supported by more
staff and widened powers. In the case of Mexico, since major regulatory issues were dealt with
in the detail of the licenses granted, the regulatory function was left within the ministry.
Experience has shown however that there are several important constraints associated
with this approach which serve to limit regulatory effectiveness. A freeze for example on public
sector recruitment or pay has immediate impact in terms of the ability to hire appropriate
qualified staff, especially where there is limited implementation  experience. In addition, as part
of the sectoral ministry, the regulators are directly influenced  by the political cycle of changes
of administration, which.adversely affect the continuity and autonomy of the regulators and
investor and public confidence in their impartiality.
An autonomous  regulator  in developing  countries?
Given  the  complexities in  not  only  establishing, but  maintaining an  autonomous
Regulator, an important question is the extent to which these are achievable in the developing
country context.  There  are particular  problems which arise with  attempting to  create  an
autonomous Regulator in developing countries.
The nature of the industry sector's  structure in developing countries is closely related
to the political and economic history of that country, which in turn serves to influence the view
of  regulation and  regulators within each country.  Sectoral arrangements  have historically
followed those adopted in industrialized countries, and so we find, for example, that in the
electricity sector the role of regulation depends on whether the French or British system was
adopted, or whether the system was nationalized or diversified. Since the legal traditions are
likewise influenced in the same manner, the legal tradition itself may prove to be an impediment
to the establishment of such a Regulator.'°
Broadly, the British approach  provides for the electricity  industry to carry on its activities
under license, and the role of govermnent, in general terms, is confined to regulation. There is
70 In countries  with  a strong  French  tradition,  the  concepL  of the administrative  law may  be such that  there  is
significant  conceptual  difficulty  with the establishment  of an autonomous  regulatory  authority  separate  from the
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no direct participation in operations. Conversely, nationalization brings operation within the
government's  scope of  activity, either by means of a govermnent department 7'  or  a public
corporation.  However,  this may well be limited to  only part of the process,  for  example
covering only  electricity  transmission and distribution  but not generation.  The  diversified
approach involves regionalized responsibility  for generation, transmission  and distribution with
a variety of players, be they federal, state, private companies, public companies, municipalities
and so forth. The point is that each of these approaches results from a different historic role or
scope to regulation.
The concept in legal terms of an autonomous  Regulator will be more difficult to absorb
in  systems which do  not  generally permit  the delegation of  executive power  and  where
significant direct government control exists. In some francophone countries, the terms of the
Constitution operate so as to require any authority which is exercising governmental functions,
such as a sectoral regulator, to be an integral part of the government organizational structure.
In other words, the law precludes the possibility of autonomous Regulator. Nevertheless, there
is evidence to show that where the "old style" of regulation covered a wide scope (connection,
customer service standards, technical and safety matters, and tariffs for example), acceptance
of a Regulator with autonomy has been easier than in jurisdictions where the legal tradition is
one of direct ministerial control. Furthermore, in certain jurisdictions the legal and de facto
independence of a Regulator may be a well accepted principle, especially where there already
exists such an authority in relation to other sectors-'
On the other hand, whilst the concept of an autonomous Regulator may be achievable
legally and acceptable politically, a balance needs to be kept.  Proliferation of agencies will of
itself create a problem; that of "regulatory  fragmentation" where a multiplicity  of agencies, with
overlapping jurisdictions in some cases, adversely affects management decision making and
becomes administratively cumbersome.
Where  there  is  sufficient political commitment to  ensure a  successful privatization
program, a separate budget for the Regulator, adequate staffing and a clear brief should be
forthcoming. The Regulator may be funded from part  of the privatization receipts and an
71  For example, in  India most telecommunications  services are  provided by  the  Department of
Telecommunications.
72 In terms  of tie law, the establishment  of an independent  regulatory  authority  for  the natural  gas industry  in
Argentina  did  not seem  to present  particular  difficulty.  Whether  that independence  can be maintained  is too early
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adequate  fee structure  thus  allowing  the authority  to hire long  term and adequately  qualified  staff
and to develop  an "institutional  memory".
Alternatives: the French Concession System and Build-Operate-Transfer (BO7) schemes
What  options  are available  to the policy-maker  apart  from the creation  of an autonomous
Regulator?  One of these regulatory  options is the concession,  broadly based on the French
model." 3 Another  is  the  Build-Operate-Transfer  (BOT)  approach, which  has  many
characteristics  of the concession  system  and has been used in some developing  countries  as a
means to promote  infrastructure  development.' 4
The Concession
The purpose of  a  concession is to  The  French  administrative  court,  the  Conseil  d'Etat,
regulate  an activity  which  is considered  (often  in the case  of Compagnie  Gdn6rale  d'Eclairage  de
aatthe  public  Bordeaux  vs.  City of  Bordeaux  defined the as a matter of law) to belong to  Ctheo  as"  cnratprvdigfo  h
secto.  Th  concpt  o  servce  pbUqueis  Cncession  as  'a  contract providing for  the sector. The concept  of service publique is  bulhding  of a  public works  or  provision  ofa public
key to the concession.  This is because  the  service  by an individual  or a company,  at their
concession  implies  a transfer  of some  of the  ownexpense,  withorwithoutsubsidyorguarzantee
attributes or  powers of the public sector to  of interest,  who are grnted in return  the right to
the  private  sector  for  a  defined period  of  operate the public infrastructure  or the public
time, regulated by the contract of concession.  service  aid to chare the users  of the public  works
orthie  persons  benefitingfrom  the  public  service."
Powers which derive from sovereignty, such
as  compulsory  acquisition  of  land  or  the  13  The Concession:  A definition
ability to levy duties, which are exercisable
by the concessionaire even where the concession itself may be silent, serve to illustrate this
implied transfer of powers. As a result, concessions  may well lead to the grant of greater rights
to the concessionaire  than  would otherwise be the case with sector-wide  regulation. Nevertheless,
with these rights go obligations: to provide service continuity  on a non-discriminatory  basis and
to adapt services to the changing needs of consumers. 75
73  For example,  in Chile, the  use of Concessions  as the instrument  governing  the  private  provision  of public
services  is derived from  the influences  of the French legal tradition.  However,  there are some key differences;
whereas  concessions  normally  have  limited  life, ranging  from 6 to 75 years  but with most  in the  range  of between
30 to 40 years. the most  striking  feature of concessions  in Chile is that they are unlimited  in time.
74  For example,  BOTs  and  their  variants  have  becn  used  in the  Philippines,  Turkey,  Thailand  and in Pakistan.
75 These  obligations  also  exist  even  if the Concession  contract  does  not expressly  state  them;  they  are related
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The concept of service publique' 6 is
Concessions  should  be distinguished  from other  also important because it serves to define the
forms of contract  for the provision  of public  scope  of  the  concession.  The  scope  of
services. Simple operation and  maintenance  concessions to private operators is, however,
agreements  can  be distinguished  due to  the
limitations  on the risk which  the operator  bears.  by the grant of monopoly  rights to
Under  a concession  and affenrage  or lease, the  either  the  State  or  a  public  authority."
operator  bears financial  risk. Furthermore,  the  Whereas originally all concessionaires were
concession  differs from affermage  in  that the  private companies  or consortia, some now are
concessionaire  rather  than  the  public  authority  bears  either wholly or partly state-owned, usually
the costs of funancing  the facilities,  repair and  as  a  result of  the  nationalization of  these
renewal  and  typically  does  not  provide  any  part  of  ,  *  Te
the income  earned  to the  public  authority  granting  prvate  consortia.  The  concession Is
the  concession.  Generally,  the  concessionaire  perhaps  best  seen  typically  as  a  bridge
finances  and builds  the facilities,  not the public  between the public and the private sectors by
authority.  allowing the private sector to provide public
-_______________________________________  _  ,  services.? 9
14 Concessions and otherforms of contracts
The concession may be granted to any
company considered by the government to be technically and financially able to provide the
public service, and, where applicable, to construct at its own expense relevant public works.'a
The concessionaire must provide those services in accordance  with the terms and conditions of
the contract of concession'  and in accordance with administrative  decisions of the public authority
76 A service publique was  generally  thought  of as any  activity  of public  interest  which  is carried  out under  the
responsibility  of  a public  body  and  subject  to  the  administrative  law  and  administrative  courts.  Over  time  however,
public  service  was widened  so as to include  industrial  or commercial  activities  carried  out in the general  interest
of the public,  but similar  to private  economic  activity  in that the activity  also  involves  the seeking  of profits.  The
civil courts have  jurisdiction  in relation  to the latter  category  of public  services.
"For  example,  in France,  monopoly  rights  were  granted  to Societe  Nationale  des Chemins  de Fer Frangais,
the French national  railway  company  in 1937  and this grant  was  reaffirmed  in 1982.
78  Ie  history  of the  use  of concessions  serves  to illustrate  the fact  that, over long  periods  of time,  perceptions
as to whether  a particular  sector  is naturally  within  the domain  of either  the public  or the private  sector  are apt to
change.
79
Until  the 1920s,  in France  the direct  provision  of public  services  by governmental  authorities  was  considered
to be a limitation  on free  enterprise.  Thus, leases  and  concessions  were  used to contract  out the  provision  of these
services.
8° If no facilities  are to be built, the concession  will  be limited  to operation  and maintenance.45  Industry Structure  and Regulation
granting the concession. Also, the autonomy of the concessionaire is an important feature."
In addition, the public authority granting the concession  is not liable to finance the infrastructure
provided by the concessionaire and the service is ideally provided in a cost efficient manner due
to the commercial and financial responsibility of the concessionaire.
If, however, significant restrictions are placed upon the concessionaire  in terms of price
control or extensive social obligations, the public authority granting the concession may need
to provide subsidies,'  which in turn will serve to limit the efficiency of the concession.
The concession system does provide a useful tool to achieve new infrastructure expansion
in those developing countries which are  able to  attract private equity investment and debt
financing on the basis of a developed body of contract laws which balance private and public
interests. It should be recognized however that the function of regulation is exercised by the
governmental authority, and therefore the issues of institutional capacity for sector specific
regulation  still  need  to  be  addressed to  the  extent  that  regulation  is  exercised  on  the
concessionaire outside of the specific contractual terms and conditions of the concession. In
short, the concession does not eliminate the need for sector wide regulation.
Build-Operate-Transfer  (BOT)  schemes
Various consultants, contractors and developing country governments have promoted a
particular approach to infrastructure projects which have been executed on the basis of Build-
Operate-Transfer schemes.' 3 The characteristics of BOTs are essentially drawn from non-
recourse project financing and the concession system, whereby the host country government
grants to a private consortium the right to finance, build and operate specified facilities for the
provision of public services. Once the project has repaid its debt and the consortium  of investors
have recouped their investment, ownership and management of the completed facilities are
transferred from the private consortium to the host government.
81  Where  the  public  authority  has  participated  directly  in the  consortium  holding  the concession,  it has  been
argued  that  the  autonomy  of the concessionaire  is thereby  impaired.  In France,  concessions  have  been  rescinded  by
the Conseil  d'Etat  (the  Administrative  Supreme  Court)  on the ground  that  the concessionaire's  autonomy  has  been
insufficient.
szFor example,  in the  provision  of urban transportation  services.
'3 Variants  of the  BOT  include  Build-Transfer-Operate  (BTO),  Build-Own-Operate-Transfer  (BOOT)  and  Build-
Own-Operate-Supply  (BOOS)  projects.Industry  Structure  and Regulation  46
The viability of a BOT depends upon
the  extent  to  which  project  sponsors  and  Tbe Expressway  and Rapid  Transit  Authority  of
lenders  are  prepared  to  take  risk  in  the  Thailand  (ETA)  built  the  first  stage  of  the Bangkok
particular developing country.  Theoretically  expressway  system with a  view  to  linking
transportation  from  the  north,  south  and  east  of the
city  and  by-passing  its  center.  Due  to  the  benefits  of
the  financial risks of the project, though in  the first  stage  of the expressway,  in  June 1987  the
practice  contingent  guarantees  are  often  Thai goverument  authorized  ETA to  consider
required of the host governrnent." This risk  private  investment  in the second  stage of the road
allocation  process invariably involves  difficult  system  by granting  a concession  to the private
and detailed negotiation. Taking this with the  sector  to build  and operate  the project  for a period
difficultie  of  clof  30 years  under  conditions  and  procedures  laid difficulties  of  clearly  describing  the  down  by  the  ETA.  In December  1988,  ETA signed
circumstances of transfer, BOT schemes have  contracts  with  the Bangkok  Expressway  Company
not  been  widely  used  even  though  Limited  (BECL),  a private  sector  consortium,  to
considerable interest has been expressed in  construct  and operate  the second  stage of the
them.  expressway.  Under  these contracts,  BECL has
*bome  all costs  of construction  and investment  risks
twithout  government  guarantee.  The  expressway  and
As  a  regulatory  tool,  the  ROT  its  accessories were  transferred to  the  ETA
approach  is  little  different  from  the  immediately  after construction,  rather than at the
concession. The terms and conditions of the  end of the 30 year concession  period. The ETA
project  contracts,  especially  the  continues  to own the assets and regulates the
Implementation  Agreement,  establish  the  behavior  of BECL  in their  operation.
framework of  rights and obligations of  the
operator. Accordingly, only the behavior  of  15 7Tailand:  A ETO  in infrastructure
the  operator  in  relation  to  the  particular
project is regulated by the BOT project contracts themselves. It follows that the supervision
function and any extraneous regulation, intended  to govern the sector as a whole, are left to the
govermnental authority granting the rights to the project company. The issues of regulatory
capacity and independence  are therefore not directly addressed by the adoption of any BOT
model.
84  These  guarantees  may cover  foreign  exchange  risks,  political  risks  and some commercial  risks outside  of
the  control  of the  project  company.47  Industry  Structure and Regulation
IV.  Conclusions
The private provision  of infrastructure  involves  a complex  inter-play  between  industry
structure, regulation  and competition.  Decisions  taken  by policy-makers  as to the structure  of
the sector  will  directly  impact  on regulatory  effectiveness.  Experience  has  shown  that difficulties
in effective  regulation  have  as much to do with inadequate  attention  to sector structure  as they
do with the institutional  capacity  of the Regulator  itself.  Competition  is a close  ally of effective
regulation  of infrastructure,  and not an alternative  to it. Furthermore,  competition  allows  the
sector to respond to market forces and often results in market driven sector restructuring.
Nevertheless,  in infrastructure  sectors,  regulation  is  necessary  to maintain  effective  competition,
if only to prevent market concentration  and the abuse of a dominant  market position by any
operator. Regulation  is also needed  to police open access  and interconnection  (in sectors such
as electricity  and telecommunications),  thereby allowing  new  entrants  to enter the market.
As regards  the tools of regulation,  despite  the declared  differences  between  the licensing
system, the concession  system and BOTs, these are in fact little more than different legal
regines or instruments  which serve to establish  the rights and obligations  of the contracting
parties. There is a menu of available  choices  as to where the rights and obligations  of service
providers are  placed, primary sector wide legislation, secondary legislation, license or
concession,  and those  choices  are shaped  by the overall  institutional  capacity  and legal  traditions
of the country  in question. Nevertheless,  of themselves  these  instruments  or contractual  regimes
do not do away with the need  to establish  effective  institutions  to carry out the regulation  of the
sector. This need  for effective  sector-wide  regulation  therefore  remains,  often  as a pre-condition
to new  entry, and whilst difficult  in the context  of developing  countries,  the policy-maker  will
be much better able to take positive steps towards the creation  of an effective independent
regulatory  regime following  the introduction  of competition  and sector restructuring.Industry  Structure  and Regulation  48
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